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ABSTRACT
In the philosophy of fiction, there is a major debate between those who hold realist
theories (theories which incur the existence of entities independent of human cognition) and
those who hold anti-realist theories (theories which incur the existence of no independent
entities). With this debate in mind, the primary goal of this essay is to construct a mentalist
theory of fictional entities and worlds. Besides the mentalism constructed herein, three other
theories are outlined and held to the same explanatory standards as the focal theory: two
augmentations of modal realism (Lewis‟ concrete realism and van Inwagen‟s abstract realism),
and a form of fictionalism which adopts as its fiction the abstract realist ontology. But these
alternate theories are explored only insofar as they assist us in understanding which explanatory
paths are fruitful and which not.
These four theories – concrete realism, abstract realism, fictionalist anti-realism, and
mentalist anti-realism – are measured against each other using two standards: (a) their ability to
explain the facts and intuitions which we have about fictional discourse, and (b) their ability to
provide consistent interpretations of the literally contradictory sentences in fictional discourse. A
theory which leaves one of these features unexplained or brings in ad hoc devises for the purpose
of explaining facts about fictional discourse is considered inferior to a theory which does not.
Concrete realism fails test (a) because it is a pure realism; abstract realism, on the other hand,
passes test (a) because it incorporates a deflationary notion of fictional worlds and is thus not a
pure realism but a hybrid of realism and anti-realism. Fictionalist anti-realism also passes both
tests, but it fails to be a genuine anti-realism. These various failures and the solutions to these
failures lead us to adopt a pretense-based Collingwoodian mentalism, which is a pure and
genuine anti-realism. This realism is found to pass both tests, and its interpretations of sentences
iii

spoken in fictional discourse are also found to be superior in both simplicity and faithfulness to
their uninterpreted (and literally contradictory) counterparts.

iv

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Realism, Anti-Realism, and Theories of Fiction
What sort of thing is Sherlock Holmes? In what kind of world does Dostoevsky‟s St.
Petersburg reside? The short answer is a single word: “fictional”; but truisms provide little
philosophical insight. In fact, an alternate subtitle to this essay could be “The Search for a
Definition of „Fiction‟.” For whatever reason, the inquiry concerning fiction (as opposed to the
broader topic of art and aesthetics) did not garner much interest until the resurgence of
metaphysics following the collapse of the project of logical positivism. In the context of this
resurgence, only two positions concerning the ontology of fictional entities were taken seriously
in Anglo-American philosophy, both of which entailed a belief in some set of mind-independent
extant entities: that is, both of these positions are realist positions.
Before we say anymore about these realist theories of fiction, let us be precise about what
we mean by realism. Jon Cogburn characterizes the broad features of realism neatly in his own
matrix, under which realism about some discourse D is the following three claims:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Sentences in D are truth apt,
Some sentences in D are true, and
The truth or falsity of sentences in D are independent of human cognition.1
It is by virtue of (1) and (2) that (3) is typically taken to entail the independent existence

of entities which guarantee the truth or falsity of sentences in D. For if these truth-values are
fixed, then something must be “out there” to fix them.
Rejection of any of these three claims is sufficient for an anti-realist position concerning
D. Rejection of (1) entails non-cognitivism; rejection of (2) entails error-theory, and rejection of
(3) entails some form of relativism. In this essay, we will concern ourselves with breeds of anti-

1

Personal communication.
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realism which reject (3).2 We are so concerned for two reasons. First, it is widely thought that
sentences in the discourse of fiction are somehow true. To reject this intuition would be
sufficiently counter-intuitive that such anti-realist theories should only be adopted when all other
theories fail. Therefore, we assume that sentences in fictional discourse are both truth-apt and
sometimes true, and we will see that this assumption has often driven the debate about realism
and anti-realism in fiction. Second, the three major theories considered herein, as well as the
fourth one constructed, all assume both (1) and (2). So for the purposes of this essay, we simplify
the defining claims of realist positions and anti-realist positions to the acceptance of (3) and the
rejection (3), respectively.
This simplification of the debate between realism and anti-realism entails that our
concern is ontology: it is the entities to which realists about fiction are attached which will
constitute the subject of our discussion. So the patented realist move of positing entities which
2

We do not go so far as Crispin Wright has gone in setting the limits of “realism” (Truth and Objectivity,
[Cambridge, Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1992]. Hereafter cited in text as TO). On Wright‟s
account, a discourse is minimally truth-apt if it adopts the platitude that facts somehow correspond to reality. And,
naturally, adoption of the platitude does not entail acceptance of the platitude. In short, minimal truth-aptness is the
deflationary theory of truth – a distinctly anti-realist position. But the Best Explanation Constraint is a method of
expanding this minimal concept of truth-aptness into a form of realism:
A discourse is more than minimally truth-apt only if mention must be made of the states of affairs
which it concerns in any best explanation of those of our beliefs expressed within it which are true
(TO, 177).
In short, the BEC allows us to gauge the influence that our discourses have on our beliefs about those discourses and
about the rest of the world. The BEC is the litmus test for the real influence that our discourses have upon us, and
much of modern science has passed this test with flying colors. It is the BEC which often brings us to be realists
about protons and electrons – for they explain the workings of electronic devices.
For a discourse to pass the BEC, it must have some degree of width of “cosmological role” – an influence in the real
world. While the BEC is, for Wright, nothing more than an intuition, this intuition is relevant because it points to the
width of a discourse‟s cosmological role. A discourse with a wide cosmological role will typically explain some or
all of the following: (a) cognitive effects, (b) pre-cognitive sensuous effects, (c) effects on physically interactive
agents, and (d) brute effects on inanimate matter. These are the marks of a realist discourse, for Wright. But our
concept of realism is not intended to be so nuanced, for it is a simpler concept. In fact, our initial concept of realism
is that creature which naively grazes while it is centered in the crosshairs of Truth and Objectivity: Platonism
(realism) versus nominalism (anti-realism). But just as Wright concludes that both sides have made unfortunate
leaps beyond their own epistemic capacities, so we will conclude that both sides have tended to make existence
claims which are too extreme – a tendency which will make an ontology both cumbersome and counter-intuitive.
This is not to say that Crispin Wright has failed to end this debate; rather, if Wright has ended the debate, then
theorists of fiction have not yet seen it happen. Therefore, one of the goals of this essay is to bring theorists of
fiction face to face with the end of this debate.
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secure the independent truth or falsity of propositions about fiction is the very move that we will
take anti-realists about fiction to be concerned with blocking. We begin by taking as our body of
evidence concerning fictional discourse the set of all sentences spoken about fictional characters
and worlds. Of these sentences, we take as relevant the ones which are spoken as if they are true.
This set of sentences is ultimately to be the evidence by which any theory of fiction must be
tested. If a theory should account for all of the evidence, then we will expect a definition of the
context in which these sentences are spoken – the so-called “fictional” context. We do not
assume a prior knowledge of what it means for a sentence to be spoken in a “fictional” context,
so any demand for such an account amounts to a demand to favor one theory over another pretheoretically. Hence, theories of fiction are often characterized by the ontological or semantical
structure which is posited as an explanation for sentences about fiction and the ways in which
these sentences are either true or false.
This structure can fail in numerous ways. The most drastic way in which it can fail is by
rendering false a class of sentences within fictional discourse which are spoken as if they are
true. Thus, theories of fiction are often measured by the ways that they must interpret these
sentences such that they come out true. Another way that a theory of fiction can fail is by
ignoring a crucial intuition concerning fictional discourse. This is considered failure because
counterintuitive theory is both more cumbersome to deploy and less likely to be believed than an
intuitive one. Another way a theory of fiction can fail is that it might deny observable facts
concerning fictional discourse. And a final, more traditional, way that a theory of fiction might
fail is by entailing contradiction. These potential failures will all be relevant to our essay.
The primary goal of this essay is to develop an anti-realist theory of ficta and fictional
worlds which is internally consistent and fails in none of the ways mentioned above. Again, in
3

the name of preserving the intuitions we have about the veracity of sentences spoken in fictional
discourse, we take anti-realism concerning ficta to be a matter of independence from or
dependence upon human cognition. To put this concept modally: realism about ficta and fictional
worlds entails that:
(4)

It is possible that there is a time t, such that there exists at least one fictum at t, and there
exists no human minds at t.

Let us, for the purposes of this essay, grant this assumption that anti-realism about ficta amounts
to relativism, for it is indeed an assumption, as there is no reason to think that functional noncognitivist theories or error theories about fictional discourse, despite their natural counterintuitiveness. In an effort to meet this goal of a relativistic theory of ficta and fictional worlds,
we take the most intuitive route: the position that ficta and fictional worlds exist in the mind as
thoughts or mentalia. Thus, we may refine the statement of our primary goal: to develop a
mentalist theory of ficta and fictional worlds which is internally consistent and fails in none of
the ways mentioned above.
In the effort of meeting these goals, we will examine the alternate theories as much as is
needed and we will borrow from them as necessary. Within this essay, we will use two
augmented modal realist theories of fiction (concrete realism and abstract realism) as metatheoretical evidence for our choice to pursue pretense theory as a model upon which to build a
fictional mentalism. But pretense theory comes prepackaged in the Tradition with its own theory
of fiction, so we will first attempt to fit this pretense theory out with a mentalist ontology. We
will discover that this naïve pretense mentalism fails to meet our requirements for a successful
theory, for it is susceptible to the mentalist‟s most troubling objection: there is no explanation for
agreement in fictional discourse which is not ad hoc. Therefore, we will pursue a sophisticated
mentalism which borrows heavily from R. G. Collingwood‟s theory of art.
4

1.2 Ficta and Fictional Worlds
To what do fictional names refer? It is widely thought by non-philosophers that proper
names refer to the existing objects which bear those names and if exception is made to this rule it
is for the sake of names in fictional discourse. Indeed, what else could a name do but designate
an object? Catering to the intuition that fictional discourse is parasitic upon normal discourse
somehow – for how could a fictional world even be conceived without the prior experience of
the actual world? – let us say that the standard use to which a name is put is the designation of an
existing object, where existence is construed as realist in the sense proposed above. Of course,
this still does not rule out the possibility that fictional names do not, in fact, refer to any existing
object. This concern, however, we will not directly address here.
Among fictional characters, there are some which are entirely fictitious – such as
Sherlock Holmes – and some which are parasitically fictitious – such as Shakespeare‟s Julius
Caesar. Julius Caesar is not intended to be a historical document, so there is a legitimate sense in
which the Shakespeare‟s Caesar is independent of the historical Caesar: Shakespeare has the
ability to send Caesar to outer space if he so chooses, and it matters not that the historical Caesar
never left Earth. Is it the case, then, that the name „Caesar‟ refers to the historical Caesar? Surely
not. If it did, then many fictional sentence about Caesar would be false. But fiction is more subtle
than that: we distinguish between the sentences which are true about the historical Caesar, the
sentences which are true about Shakespeare‟s Caesar, and the sentences which are true about
both. But we need some way to distinguish the actual Julius Caesar from the fictional Julius
Caesar, so that we may allow sentences about each to be true: we must separate the fictional and
historical discourses. The theoretical structure most suited to this task is the concept of fictional
worlds. So before we address the problem of the ontology of ficta, we must first describe the
5

context in which we find such entities – we must say something about the worlds which separate
ficta from each other and from actually existing entities (hereafter: actualia).
Like any definition of art in modern aesthetics, an adequate definition of fiction assumes
the prior existence of a theory of fiction. Therefore, we will attempt to define fiction later and for
now we will be content to focus on uncontroversial canonical examples of fiction such as
Dostoevsky‟s Crime and Punishment, Conan Doyle‟s stories about Sherlock Holmes, and
Shakespeare‟s Julius Caesar. Prima facie, works of fiction take the form of a description of the
doings and happenings of people or creatures in a world, but this description is a false
description – these doings and happenings were not done and did not happen in the actual world.
Rather, they take place in a fictional world, where the entities to which these happenings occur
reside – and these worlds may differ from each other as much as they differ from the actual
world. The world in which Sherlock Holmes lives is a world in which it is (in a non-technical
way) practically possible for a seasoned detective to solve every case he has ever taken on (this
is a practical impossibility in the actual world) – and this is one of the rules of Sherlock Holmes‟
world which circumscribes the potential events of the world. Conan Doyle expanded the
practical rules of the actual world when he invented his Sherlock Holmes world, for in Conan
Doyle‟s Sherlock Holmes world there exists a man of such genius that no mystery can elude his
acumen.
So it is apparent that ficta are subordinate to the rules of the worlds in which they reside.
Therefore, the concept of fictional worlds must be explored with as much fervor as the concept
of fictional characters, as it appears that our concept of ficta will piggyback upon our concept of
fictional worlds. To this end, it will behoove us to tentatively appropriate Kendall Walton‟s
concept of fictional worlds:
6

Each fictional world is associated with a particular class or cluster of propositions – those
propositions that are fictional in that world. Some will be tempted to identify fictional worlds with
these clusters of propositions…. This would make fictional worlds look very much like possible
worlds, for a standard way of construing the worlds is as sets of propositions. But fictional worlds
are not possible worlds. Two differences, especially, have been discussed elsewhere: Fictional
worlds are sometimes impossible and usually incomplete, whereas possible worlds (as normally
construed) are necessarily both possible and complete. 3

The cluster of propositions about which Walton speaks is not the group of sentences which
constitute the text; rather, it is the set of propositions which are entailed by the (fictionally true)
sentences in the text. The way in which these propositions are entailed by the sentences in the
text is one that must be clarified in any theory which adopts Walton‟s notion of fictional worlds,
but because more than one theory of fiction will be outlined, we will stave this task off until we
have better clarified our theory. Let us merely say that while all propositions which constitute a
fictional world are somehow true, not all sentences in the text will be true (e.g. when a character
speaks a lie). As Walton observes in the passage above, one defensible position identifies the
cluster of propositions with the fictional world, but this need not be the case.
In addition to the association with a cluster of propositions, Walton‟s notion of
incompleteness will prove to be critical to our discussion of the ontology of ficta and fictional
worlds.
1.3 The Problem of Ontology and the Bifurcation in Speech
We can immediately classify two types of positions concerning ficta and fictional worlds:
realism and anti-realism. In accord with the sketch above, realists believe that ficta and fictional
worlds are entities that exist apart from or beyond mere human cognition. Conversely, antirealists believe that whatever the makeup of the world external to the human mind, there are
certainly no fictional characters or worlds to be found in it. So, one might ask, why be a realist?

3

Kendall Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, (London, England: Harvard, 1990), p. 64. Hereafter cited in text as
Mimesis.
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In order to answer this question, we must first lay out the ontological problem as it is
traditionally understood.
There are generally thought to be three classes of sentences involving ficta and fictional
worlds.4 Though any theory which adopts Walton‟s model of fictional worlds will need to
determine how propositions are entailed by the sentences of a text, let it be noted that we take the
example sentences offered herein to be uncontroversial examples of sentences which entail
propositions. And because all of the propositions constituting a fictional world are true, these
sentences must all be somehow true.
The first class, the so-called “fictional” sentences, are just the sort that are found in works
of fiction: they describe what is the case from within that fictional world. Thus, the defining
feature of these sentences is that they describe a fictional world as if it were the real world.
Whether these sentences are actually found in texts is not relevant to whether they are fictional
sentences, though there is certainly some priority given to the particular sentences which
constitute a complete fictional text (i.e. the sentences that Dostoevsky eventually published as
Crime and Punishment). Some examples of this first class are:
(F1) (a)
(b)

Rodion Raskolnikov is a murderer.
Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.

What is most curious about these sentences – and what will later prove to be most troublesome –
is that they are spoken in precisely the same way as sentences which describe actualia. So there
appears to be a sense in which ficta are the same as actualia. This similarity in usage is the
defining feature of the fictional class of sentences about ficta.

4

Though these groupings are not unique to Stuart Brock‟s work, their designations have been borrowed from his
essay “Fictionalism about Fictional Characters,” Noûs 36, 1 (2002): 1-21. Hereafter cited in text as “Fictionalism”.
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The second class of sentences about ficta and fictional worlds is sometimes called the
“critical” class of sentences. These sentences are used by persons in the actual world who refer to
ficta and fictional worlds in some critical way. In other words, these sentences are spoken with
an awareness that the speaker is outside the fictional world. They might be used to compare ficta
and fictional worlds to the actual world (inter-comparative critical sentences), to another fictional
world (intra-comparative critical sentences), or they might be used non-comparatively to analyze
the structure of a fictional world (analytic critical sentences). The defining feature of
comparative critical sentences is that they make reference to ficta in a cross-world fashion
(regardless of whether the world is fictional or actual). On the other hand, the defining feature of
analytic critical sentences is that they could not have been spoken about the real world: fictional
characters are recognized as characters and not as persons. Some examples of critical sentences
are the following:
(F2) (a)
(b)
(c)

Sherlock Holmes is a more clever detective than Porfiry Petrovich.
Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective.
Rodion Raskolnikov is an archetypal character.

The third class of sentences about ficta and fictional worlds is the existential class. These
sentences are typically negative atomic propositions asserting that ficta and their worlds do not
exist. Normally, such sentences would be uttered casually and pre-philosophically. For example,
(F3) (a)
(b)

Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist.
Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

All three of the foregoing classes of sentences are instances of sentences which most of
us who are familiar enough with the texts would assent to without a second thought. The class of
sentences that stand out most prominently for the debate between realism and anti-realism in
fiction is the third class, the existential class. „Sherlock Holmes does not exist‟ is a literal
existence claim which seems to end the debate immediately – in the anti-realist‟s favor.
9

However, should we be willing to grant literal truth to this claim, we will be required to
determine how it can be the case that sentences of the first and second classes can still be true. If
it we allow fictional names to refer, then Raskolnikov and Holmes do exist, and thus we would
have direct contradiction with our third class – for how could Raskolnikov be a murderer if he is
nothing at all? A secondary problem is that we would also be inclined to think that non-existent
things do not have properties typically attributed to actualia (such as being-a-murderer). These
kinds of properties are had by physical objects in the actual world, which does not tell us much
about what we mean when we say that Raskolnikov is a murderer. Nevertheless, it is certain that
(F1a) must be literally false if (F3a) is to be literally true. The problem of the ontology of fiction,
then, is this: a simultaneous literal translation of all three types of sentences will inevitably lead
us to contradiction. Hence, the appropriate interpretation of these three classes of sentences has
been a central feature of the debate about the ontology of ficta and fictional worlds.
But what constitutes an “appropriate” interpretation of a class of sentences about fiction?
What will be our standards of appropriateness? We have already hinted at the answer to this
question in our descriptions of the fictional and critical classes of sentences. Aside from the fact
that we make negative existential claims about ficta, we also tend to describe them in two very
distinct ways: we speak of ficta sometimes as if from within a fictional world and sometimes as if
from without.
When one reads Crime and Punishment, one is left with the impression that if
Dostoevsky were asked what color Raskolnikov‟s hair is, he would have an answer. This
phenomenon suggests that fictional worlds are to be thought of as fully fleshed out and complete
when described from within. There is nothing, in principle, that prevents Dostoevsky from
describing every single detail of the fictional Petersburg in Crime and Punishment, except the
10

infinite nature of the demand. This in lack of in principle limit to the determinacy of a fictional
world is based on the fact that an author cannot be wrong when he writes fictional sentences. If
we take this apparent in-principle determinacy as a fact, then this fact suggests the intuition that
the details of fictional worlds seem to be “out there” in the fiction world, regardless of whether
they are written by Dostoevsky or not. And even if they are not “out there”, at least they are to be
thought of as if they are “out there”, for an in-principle determinate world may be, in fact, more
determinable than its canonical description demands. In short, when we speak fictional sentences
as if from within the fictional world, we seem to be participating in the fiction, which entails that
we have the freedom to imagine the features of this world to an unlimited degree of
determination. Thus, when we speak fictionally, or as if from within, we assume the position that
the fictional world is complete and fully determined.
On the other hand, when a literary critic speaks about Crime and Punishment, provided
she is a faithful critic, she will never assume any proposition concerning the fictional world
which is not at least implied by Dostoevsky in the sentences of the text. She will never assume
that she knows how many hairs are on Raskolnikov‟s head, because no mention is made of this
number in the text itself. Thus, when we speak critically, or from without, we assume the
position that fictional world is incomplete and underdetermined. To this extent, the way we
speak about ficta is very distinct from the way we speak about actualia. Let us call these opposite
positions concerning the completeness and determination of fictional worlds the Bifurcation in
Speech.
The Problem of the Ontology of Ficta – viz. that we do not seem to speak consistently
about whether ficta exist or about how they exist if they do – must be solved with the Bifurcation
in mind. Not only must our ontology be sufficiently robust to provide an interpretation under
11

which all three classes of sentences can be simultaneously true, but it must also be sufficiently
robust to explain the fact of the Bifurcation in Speech.
1.4 Fictional Incompleteness, the Sorites Paradox, and the Bifurcation
Roy Sorensen has developed an argument that bolsters our choice of desiderata for a
theory of fiction by demonstrating that the Bifurcation is more than a mere intuitive illusion.5
This argument shows that a good theory of fiction must account for the similarity between sorites
paradoxes produced by fiction and standard sorites paradoxes. Sorensen begins with an example
of a traditional sorites argument: Assume that:
(5)

1 minute after noon is noonish.

Assume also that
(6a) If 1 minute after noon is noonish, then 2 minutes after noon is noonish.
Thus, we may construct the rule
(6)

If n minutes after noon is noonish, then n + 1 minutes after noon is noonish.6

We may now iterate as many times as necessary to arrive at the absurdity that
(7)

Six hundred minutes after noon is noonish.

Yet, six hundred minutes after noon is not noonish, because ten o‟clock PM is well into the
night. Hence, the sorites argument produces a paradox.
Sorensen observes that a sorites argument can be constructed based on fictional
incompleteness. Let us assume that Sherlock Holmes is determinately complete in his own
fictional world. We begin with a safe statement such as

5

Roy Sorensen, “Fictional Incompleteness as Vagueness,” Erkenntnis, 34 (1991): 54-72. Hereafter cited in text as
“Incompleteness”
6
Sorensen makes sure to point out that “the negation of the induction step is equivalent to the assertion that there is
a precise division point between times that are noonish and times that are not” (56ff). But, of course, imprecision is
essential to the concept of „noonish‟. Thus, we cannot dismiss this argument on account of a false induction in (6).
He responds similarly to the induction step in the fiction sorites (“Incompleteness” 57).

12

(8)

Sherlock Holmes had at least 0 hairs on his head.

Because hairs cannot come in a quantity fewer that 0, this statement is true by definition. But the
number of hairs on Sherlock Holmes‟ head is not specified in any story, and it is likely that he
had at least one hair, because nearly all human beings do:
(9a) If Sherlock Holmes had at least 0 hairs on his, then he had at least 1 hair on his head.
And we can assume with nearly equal confidence that:
(9b) If Sherlock Holmes had at least 1 hair on his head, then he had at least 2 hairs on his
head.
This step can be iterated as many times as necessary, so we reformulate our second premise:
(9)

If Sherlock Holmes had at least n hairs on his head, then he had n + 1 hairs on his head.

But now we will find ourselves knee deep in absurdities such as
(10) Sherlock Holmes had at least one billion hairs on his head (“Incompleteness” 56).
Because Conan Doyle never mentioned how many hairs were on Sherlock Holmes‟ head, there is
no definite “least number” of hairs. Nevertheless, no human being has more than a few hundred
thousand hairs on her head. Again, we have paradox.
The diagnosis of standard sorites arguments is that they are caused by vagueness, and the
obvious similarity between the two arguments suggests that vagueness is also involved in the
fiction sorites argument. According to Sorensen, “vagueness theorists have not displayed much
sympathy for the view that objects can be vague. Generally, they take vagueness to be a feature
of predicates rather than a feature of the things to which predicates apply” (“Incompleteness”
56).7 Should a fiction theorist attempt to explain the fiction sorites via a concept of vagueness,

7

I quote: “Despite general suspicion of the notion of vague objects among vagueness theorists, detailed discussion
of the notion has centered around a single argument advanced by Gareth Evans: 1978, „Can There be Vague
Objects?‟, Analysis 38. Althought Evans‟ argument has been criticized as inconclusive, few have gone on to assert
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such a fiction theorist will be guilty of assuming that an inductive fact can explain its own
existence. For “vagueness is the diagnosis of the sorites paradox, not a defining condition of it”
(“Incompleteness” 58). Therefore, it is the vagueness itself – that paradox-producing
phenomenon – that must be explained by a theory of fiction. So any theory of fiction whose
treatment of the fiction sorites does not diagnose the paradox as a consequence of vagueness
(like all sorites arguments) must not only explain why the two paradoxes are to be treated
differently (on pain of an ad hoc theory), but it must also tell us from whence the vagueness
comes. For Sorensen, the natural response is to simply accept that the two are both a
consequence of semantic vagueness.
Sorensen concludes that “all fictional incompleteness is vagueness.”8 This interpretation
of fictional incompleteness suggests that the fictionally incomplete character, Sherlock Holmes,
is really just a complete character vaguely portrayed. In other words, when we speak of Sherlock
Holmes from within his fictional world, he has a definite number of hairs on his head, just as he
has a definite number of freckles on his right hand. There is no vagueness in the real world, only
vagueness in our talk about the real world. Similarly, there is no vagueness within a fictional
world – only vague description of that fictional world. When we speak of Sherlock Holmes
critically, comparing him to other characters and to the real world, it seems that he is something
like an incomplete bundle of properties which are typically exemplified by humans.

that there are vague objects. One member of this small group is Bertil Rolf who discusses the issue in his Topics on
Vagueness” (“Incompleteness”, 71, endnote 12).
8
Sorensen‟s summarizes his argument as follows: “All fictional incompleteness is a matter of some questions about
a story being left indeterminate. All such indeterminacy is (either directly or indirectly) numerical. Hence all
fictional incompleteness implies numerical indeterminacy. Wherever we have numerical indeterminacy, it is
possible to construct a fiction sorites argument. So all fictional incompleteness breeds fiction sorites arguments. But
all fiction sorites arguments arise because the indeterminacy is a form of hidden vagueness. Therefore, we conclude
that all fictional incompleteness is vagueness” (“Incompleteness” 61).
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The distinction between speaking of a character from within a fictional world and
speaking of a character from without, a distinction rejected by Fred Adams, Gary Fuller and
Robert Stecker as needlessly disunified,9 is actually a structure which is capable of bearing the
type of vagueness which we find in the distinction between objects and predicates. Fiction sorites
paradoxes demonstrate that the within/without Bifurcation that seems to occur across our three
classes of sentences is a feature that we are not justified in rejecting. In fact, it is apparent that
the Bifurcation is much more than an intuition, it is, as we suggested earlier, an empirical fact
about fiction which will need to be explained by any serious theory of fiction.10 What is required
of such an explanation is that it addresses both sides of the Bifurcation. On the one side, the
disengaged side, we have incompleteness, now characterized as vagueness, which allows us to
construct fiction sorites arguments. On the other side, the engaged side, we have the objects
about which our speech is vague. When we speak about ficta from this other side, our speech is
only subject to standard sorites arguments; fiction sorites arguments do not apply. For, as we
have said, Watson could simply count the hairs on Sherlock Holmes‟ head. And if Evans‟
argument is to be trusted, these objects are not themselves vague.

9

“The Semantics of Fictional Names,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78 (1997): 128-148. Hereafter cited in text
as “Semantics”.
10
It bears noting that Braun maintains a distinction between Holmes1, a non-referring name, and Holmes2, a
referring name. On Braun‟s account, Holmes2 refers to an abstractly existing fictional character (“Empty Names…”
609). While this distinction does explain the Bifurcation, it also explicitly relies on a realist ontology, so Braun‟s
explanation of the bifurcation is quite useless to the anti-realist.
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CHAPTER 2. AUGMENTED MODAL REALISM
2.1 Concrete Realism
Sorensen‟s reflections on the completeness of fictional worlds leads us to suppose that
our critical sentences about fictional worlds are a consequence of the vague description of a
genuinely complete world filled with determinate objects which lack any vagueness. The
simplest theory which can capture this intuition is concrete realism. For the concrete realist, ficta
are concrete entities which populate other concrete worlds just like ours, but to which we have
no physical access. In this sense, and in many others, concrete fictional realism is strongly
related to concrete modal realism. Indeed, the same man defends both positions: David Lewis.
For Lewis, although it is possible that a man in the actual world might bear all the
properties of Sherlock Holmes, this man is not Sherlock Holmes, because he lives in the wrong
world. Conan Doyle imagined a fictional world in which Sherlock Holmes lived, so the speech
act „Holmes‟ is only an ordinary proper name in the world in which he lives. When the name
“Holmes” is written in a context outside his home world, it only refers to that concrete being
which fills the function of Holmes in that world:
The sense of “Sherlock Holmes” as we use it is such that, for any world w where the Holmes
stories are told as known fact rather than fiction, the name denotes at w whichever inhabitant of w
it is who there plays the role of Holmes. Part of that role, of course, is to bear the ordinary proper
name “Sherlock Holmes”. But that only goes to show that “Sherlock Holmes” is used at w as an
ordinary proper name, not that it is so used here. 11

Lewis believes that Sherlock Holmes is essentially a person, but he is a person whom we
think about in functional terms. Lewis explains the incompleteness of fiction as a simple matter
of the underdetermination of fictional worlds. While there are a finite number of Holmes stories,
their collective description of the fictional world of Sherlock Holmes is not sufficiently

11

David Lewis, “Truth in Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 15, 1 (1978): 37-46. Hereafter cited in text as
“Truth in Fiction”.
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comprehensive to determine all the features of a fully fleshed out concrete reality. There are
many descriptions of places and events whose details have been left unmentioned. Thus, there
are potentially infinitely many determinate Sherlock Holmes worlds – corresponding to all the
various elliptical descriptions in Conan Doyle‟s writing – and the stories describe all of them
(“Truth in Fiction” 39). This entails that there are numerous concretely existing Sherlock
Holmeses about whom all the stories are true. Some Holmeses have fewer hairs than others,
some Holmeses have fewer 5th cousins than others, and so on. The only propositions that can be
said to be true of all Sherlock Holmeses are the propositions expressed in Conan Doyle‟s stories.
Succinctly,
A sentence of form “In fiction f, ” is true iff  is true at every world where f is told as known
fact rather than fiction (“Truth in Fiction” 41).

For Lewis, then, propositions are associated with fictional sentences in just the same way as
propositions are associated with any other kind of sentence in a natural language. We will
assume that this means of association is uncontroversial and continue.
Let us consider the concrete realist‟s interpretations of our three classes of sentences
about ficta and fictional worlds. A concrete realist paraphrases existential sentences thus:
(F3) (a′) Rodion Raskolnikov does not actually exist.
(b′) Sherlock Holmes does not actually exist.
In this paraphrase, „actual‟ simply means „in this concrete world‟.
Concrete realists may interpret fictional sentences almost literally, because fictional
sentences are taken as describing a fictional world from within: they are the told as fact, just not
in this world. On Lewis‟ account, Conan Doyle imagined an existing determinate world which he
described in his stories, and in this determinate world, „Sherlock Holmes‟ is a proper name that
refers to a detective. More specifically, Conan Doyle pretended to be telling the Sherlock
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Holmes stories as known fact – he pretended to be Watson. So the propositions which are
associated with the fictional sentences are all true, but they are world specific, so our
interpretation is minimal. Let w designate the world(s) where the fiction is told as known fact,
and let this fiction be designated by a subscript:
(F1) (a′) In wCP, Rodion Raskolnikov is a murderer.
(b′) In wSH, Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.
Critical sentences must be interpreted in function terms, for Lewis. We will therefore
designate proper names which refer functionally with quotation marks. A further convenience for
concrete realism is that properties are not world-indexed, so cross-world comparison poses no
major problem:
(F2) (a′) In wSH, „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more clever detective than „Porfiry
Petrovich‟ does in wCP.
(b′) In wSH „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more famous detective than any detective
does in the actual world.
(c′) In wCP „Rodion Raskolnikov‟ plays an archetypal role.
I should stress that our subscripts, which appear to isolate a single world do not, in fact, have this
function. WCP refers to an entire set of worlds, all different from each other, but each of which
fits the description in Crime and Punishment. It is for this very reason that the concrete realist
has no choice but to assume that properties remain constant across worlds. So, to summarize, we
have:
Interpretation under Concrete Realism
(F1) (a′) In wCP, Rodion Raskolnikov is a murderer.
(b′) In wSH, Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.
(F2) (a′) „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more clever detective in wSH than „Porfiry
Petrovich‟ does in wCP.
(b′) In wSH „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more famous than any detective does in
the actual world.
(c′) In wCP „Rodion Raskolnikov‟ plays an archetypal role.
(F3) (a′) Rodion Raskolnikov does not actually exist.
(b′) Sherlock Holmes does not actually exist.
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Concrete realism has two distinct and strongly attractive benefits. The first is that, prima
facie, it neatly accommodates the intuition that fictional worlds are. The second is that in the
concrete realist‟s interpretations, all proper names refer, so there is no need to trouble with the
consequences of empty names.
In addition to these benefits, concrete realism is capable of explaining the disengaged
side of the Bifurcation quite smoothly. Because of the limitations of human expression, no author
can pinpoint a fictional world down to the smallest detail – this would take an eternity to do.
Thus, the perceived incompleteness is actually a form of vagueness (just as Sorensen demands):
the author simply did not determine the fiction precisely enough to narrow the referent worlds
down to unity. Nevertheless, the author still writes his story as if he were in a single (fictional)
world – and he must do so, for such are the limitations of humankind.
However, concrete realism falters when it attempts to address the engaged side of the
Bifurcation. Lewis describes Arthur Conan Doyle has having pretended to be Watson describing
the doings of his detective roommate. But what this really amounts to in Lewis‟ theory is that
Conan Doyle pretended that the world he described was complete, or at least complete in
principle. But even in fictional sentences, wSH does not pick out a single world; it picks out a set
of worlds which fit the functional description. Lewis can avoid this worry by privileging one
Sherlock Holmes world over the others and designating this as the world that Conan Doyle
pretended to be in when he pretended to be Watson. But this move is not very promising. This
arbitrary privileging of one world over another does disservice to Lewis‟ explanation of the
disengaged side of the Bifurcation. If a single world is privileged, then we have no need of
functional description. We can simply refer to Sherlock Holmes the man, because we have a
single privileged world (though we do not know which) identified by Conan Doyle. Until Lewis
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provides an account of what it could mean to pretend to be in a fictional world (singular), it
appears that we will not be able to reconcile this concept of pretense with Lewis identification of
wSH with a set of fictional worlds. Either Crime and Punishment picks out a single determinate
world or it picks out a set of determinate worlds, so Lewis can only accommodate one side of the
Bifurcation.
Moreover, concrete realism is fails to explain one of the most central intuitions about
fictional discourse: the notion that we create or generate ficta and fictional worlds is entirely
unsupported under this theory. It is already absurd enough that we are positing an infinity of
worlds just like ours, so if Lewis asks us to believe that we also create these worlds, then we
should not be faulted if we respond “no, thank you.” But he won‟t ask this of us. If we can
generate concrete fictional worlds by imagining them, then other worlds could generate ours by
imagining it, and Lewis must have recognized this absurdity as such. Lewis is hesitant to
privilege fictional (and possible) worlds beyond the mere happenstance that we live in the
“actual” world. Other worlds are populated by beings which are just as real as we are, so, as with
all other features of concrete realism, if any powers are granted to us in this world, they must
also be granted to our counterparts in other worlds. Consequently, we cannot posit the ability to
create fictional worlds.
This is not the only potential absurdity with which concrete realism is faced. Until now, I
have been quite generous in my interpretation of Lewis‟ concept of fiction, perhaps too generous.
Lewis, for whatever reason, maintains that only in those worlds where the fiction is told word for
word as truth are worlds do the proper names in that fiction refer – even if all the events depicted
occur just as depicted (“Truth in Fiction” 41). This apparently arbitrary limitation on the
reference of functional proper names can only be made sense of when one considers what sort of
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objection Lewis might have been trying to anticipate. There are many stories that are told as
known truth in the actual world which did not happen precisely as depicted. In fact, the truism
that “every person has his own story” suggests that almost no story ever told as truth depicts the
events exactly as they happen. So if Lewis‟ standard for a story being fictional is the faithful
depiction of the events in a world, then his definition of fiction will end up being fatally
infelicitous: nearly every story ever told is fictional by virtue of e.g. exaggeration, figurative
speech, metaphor, etc. And if avoiding this pitfall is the only reason that Lewis suggests this
constraint (he provides no other reason, anyhow), then the constraint is clearly ad hoc. Unless the
concrete realist can independently motivate the seemingly arbitrary restriction of referent
possible worlds to those in which a given fictional story is told word-for-word as known truth,
we have a dilemma: concrete realism is either an ad hoc theory or it is infelicitous to our concept
of fiction.
Perhaps just as absurd is Lewis‟ claim that fictional tales could be told as truth in another
world. Though a concrete realist might conceivably find an independent motivation for the
apparently arbitrary restriction of referent possible worlds, it will suffice for our purposes to
merely observe that this restriction is utterly implausible. I quote from a random page in Crime
and Punishment:
Having said this, Svidrigailov suddenly laughed again. It was clear to Raskolnikov that this
was a man who was firmly set on something, and who kept his own counsel.
“You must not have talked with anyone for several days?” he asked.
“Almost right. And so? You‟re no doubt surprised that I‟m such a congenial man?”
“No, I‟m surprised that you‟re a much too congenial man.”12

One need not have any knowledge of Crime and Punishment to recognize this passage as fiction.
It is not the content that marks it as distinctly fiction to the reader, but rather the style. Most

12

Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, tr. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky, (New York: Random
House, 1992), 284.
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stories which are told as truth – at least ones that are as complex as Crime and Punishment – are
biographies or histories which are riddled with references, guesses, conscious interpretations, and
qualifications. In other words, long and complex stories which are told as truth in this world are
almost always self-consciously constrained to the facts at hand. This sort of constraint is rarely
found in fiction works – perhaps only in post-modernist novels such as Mark Danielewski‟s
House of Leaves. Furthermore, there are myriad instances in which Dostoevsky describes the
thoughts of a character as if from an omniscient perspective, but such a fiction may only have
been told as truth – in any world – by a telepath or a god. Lewis surely was not suggesting that
we lean on psychic powers for a concept of fiction. We conclude, then, that this theory collapses
when put to use.
2.2 Abstract Realism
Though we refer to Peter van Inwagen as an abstract realist about ficta, reduction of ficta
to abstracta is only half of the story. 13 Like concrete realism, abstract realism is an adaptation of
modal realism: fictional worlds are, in many senses, the same as possible worlds. 14 The first
sense in which fictional worlds differ from possible worlds for the abstract realist is that they
need not be completely possible – impossible worlds exist also. The second sense in which
fictional worlds differ from possible worlds, for van Inwagen, is that the story of modal realism
only addresses the disengaged side of the Bifurcation. The engaged side of the Bifurcation is,
strangely enough, deflated by means of an anti-realist explanation. But let us explore the abstract
realist‟s ontology before we consider her act of deflation.

13

Peter van Inwagen, “Creatures of Fiction,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 14, 4 (1977): 299-308. Hereafter
cited in text as “Creatures”. See also W. R. Carter, “Do Creatures of Fiction Exist?,” Philosophical Studies, 38
(1980): 205-215.
14
See Alvin Plantinga, Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality, ed. Matthew Davidson, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
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For an abstract realist such as van Inwagen, ficta “belong to a broader category of things
[called] theoretical entities of literary criticism” (“Creatures” 302). Though van Inwagen does
not say much about fictional worlds, a glance at his treatment of ficta suggests that one may
interpolate a realist Waltonian stance concerning them: fictional worlds are webs of propositions
existing abstractly (i.e. not in the physical universe, and not exclusively in the mind, but in their
own realm), and the propositions that comprise these fictional worlds are all true. Whether or not
van Inwagen actually intended to augment abstract modal realism (and I think he did), this
position seems to me the strongest position for an abstract realist, so we will adopt it for the
abstract realist. The augmentations to modal realism are threefold: (a) the webs of propositions
have a structure, and this structure is one of the subjects of literary criticism; (b) the propositions
in the web do not completely determine the fictional world and are thus incomplete, because they
are, as a rule, tied to the sentences in the text itself; and (c) there is some measure of
impossibility permitted, but we will let literary criticism handle this task as well.
A simplistic construal of abstract realism would maintain that Sherlock Holmes is
nothing more than the collection of propositions describing him which can be derived from the
stories written about him – a subset of his world. However, this is not the position that van
Inwagen takes. For van Inwagen, it would be more accurate to say that the characters in the
fictional worlds are the bundles of properties ascribed to (van Inwagen‟s term) them in the true
propositions which constitute the world. For van Inwagen, the primary method of reference to
ficta is via definite description, and proper names are a secondary method of reference which is
parasitic upon the primary (“Creatures” 307). Here we see a distinction between persons in the
real world and characters in fictional worlds. A person possesses or exemplifies a property;
whereas, a character is ascribed or encodes a property. And a property can be encoded only by a
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fictional entity (a fictum): an entity x encodes a property F iff F is one among a set of properties
which exhaustively constitute x. A character cannot be a detective in the same way that a person
can, because a character just is its properties; whereas, a person possesses her properties. To say
that Sherlock Holmes is a detective is to say that the property being-a-detective is one of the
properties which constitutes Sherlock Holmes. Again, these properties are exhaustively
constitutive of Sherlock Holmes.
Because the abstract realist, unlike the concrete realist, admits the fact of Bifurcation in
Speech, our existential class of sentences has a bifurcated interpretation. Consequently, we must
split „Rodion Raskolnikov‟ and „Sherlock Holmes‟ into two names, each with a different
function. Rodion Raskolnikov1 will be used for the proper name embedded in the text, and about
which fictional sentences are spoken. We have already hinted that the abstract realist adopts a
deflationary position concerning these usages, so, pending this deflationary explanation, the
abstract realist may interpret existential sentences about these engaged usages literally. Rodion
Raskolnikov2 will be used for the proper name when it appears in a disengaged context – that is,
in critical sentences. In this context, existential sentences must be interpreted to state that Rodion
Raskolnikov2 is an abstract entity. Hence:
(F3) (a1″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 does not exist.
(a2″) Rodion Raskolnikov2 does not exist except as an abstract entity.
A critical sentence can only be true if it expresses a proposition which is true in the
fictional world, and the web of propositions which constitutes the fictional world is derived from
(implied by, extracted from, suggested by) the text itself. This web of propositions constituting
the fictional world is incomplete, for we are restricted to only the propositions which can be
gleaned from the text; nevertheless, its target is maximality. So the set of propositions which
constitutes a fictional world is that set which describes the fictional world down to the greatest
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detail it possible. For every sentence written by an author, there exists an abstract proposition (or
a set of abstract propositions) which partially constitute(s) the world. Using our concept of
encoding, the abstract realist paraphrases critical claims thus:
(F2) (a″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to x degree of cleverness;
whereas Porfiry Petrovich2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to y degree of
cleverness, and x > y.
(b″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-famous-detective to x degree of famousness,
and x is greater than the degree of famousness to which any real person exemplifies
being-a-famous-detective.15
The only apparent interpretational benefit to being an abstract realist is that analytic critical
sentences may be taken literally, provided that we define a character as a bundle of human
properties. Our previous example, „Rodion Raskolnikov is an archetypal character‟ is one such
sentence. This sentence may be interpreted literally because a character is the sort of entity
which we would expect to be composed of properties, for it lacks the implied personhood that a
name like Sherlock Holmes bears. A character can only exist in a fictional world; whereas, a
detective can only exist in the real world.
The last class of sentences to be interpreted, the sentences which are written by authors
and published as works of fiction, “[do] not represent an attempt at reference or description”
(“Creatures” 301), thus “they are not used by their authors as the vehicles of assertions”
(“Creatures” 307). This is because these sentences literally generate the ficta about which we
speak critically and existentially. If abstract realists were to take these fictional sentences
literally, then there would be contradiction between fictional and existential sentences because
the only sort of thing that can being a murderer is a concrete entity, namely a person. Hence, we
say that for abstract realism, fictional sentences generate characters and fictional worlds, but do

15

We assume, here, that more or less cleverness or famousness can be represented in numerical quantities. While
this is certainly a simplification, it still accommodates the intuition that one can be more clever or more famous than
another.
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not assert anything about them: assertion is saved for critical sentences and existential sentences.
Because these engaged sentences do not even attempt to assert, we may take the van Inwagen as
a non-cognitivist about the engaged context: engaged fictional discourse is not truth-apt. Thus we
have:
Interpretation under Abstract Realism
(F1) (a″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer. [no truth value, no interpretation]
(b″) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin. [no truth value, no interpretation]
(F2) (a″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to x degree of cleverness;
whereas Porfiry Petrovich2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to y degree of
cleverness, and x > y.
(b″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-famous-detective to x degree of famousness,
and x is greater than the degree of famousness to which any real person exemplifies
being-a-famous-detective
(c″) Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal bundle of human properties.
(F3) (a1″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 does not exist.
(a2″) Rodion Raskolnikov2 does not exist except as an abstract entity.
(b1″) Sherlock Holmes1 does not exist.
(b2″) Sherlock Holmes2 does not exist except as an abstract entity.
This ontology of abstract realism affords a very satisfactory explanation of the
Bifurcation. The fictional sentences that are uttered and written by authors are purely inventive
and completely non-cognitive, which reflects the fact that we can never tell an author that he is
“wrong” when he writes a sentence: Conan Doyle can have Sherlock Holmes play any
instrument he wants him to play. It is this fact that leads van Inwagen to suggest that the action
involved in fictional sentences is an encoding or an ascription. When Conan Doyle writes that
Sherlock Holmes plays the violin, he is not asserting it to be the case, for it is not the case until
Conan Doyle writes the sentence; rather, he is fashioning a character from nothing. Now that we
have posited that fictional sentences do not represent any attempt to assert and therefore have no
truth-value, we can accommodate the intuition that a fictional sentence treats fictional worlds as
if they are complete: we seem to speak this way only because a fictional sentence does not have
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to answer to a truth-value, so there is never a conscious restriction on what may be said about a
fictional world in fictional sentences. Conversely, critical sentences do answer to a truth-value.
These sentences are uttered or written after the fiction has already been generated, so these
genuine assertions are strictly limited to what has already been generated by the (non-assertive)
fictional sentences.
But must van Inwagen resist the notion that proper fictional names refer? Must the
abstract realist maintain a deflationary position in the engaged context? Nathan Salmon
compares this move to buying a Lamborghini only to keep it locked in the garage. If we are
going to help ourselves to abstracta, we might as well use them wherever we can – perhaps we
can invent a new category of things to which proper names refer in fictional sentences. Suppose,
then, that we do posit a set of entities about which fictional sentences assert truths. There are two
possibilities: either these ficta are discovered or they are invented. Amie Thomasson suggests
that if we are not willing to adopt the position that ficta are invented, then we have some
explaining to do about what exactly it is that humans create when they create.16
In fact, one of the greatest benefits of the abstract realist‟s position is that it
accommodates the intuition that fictional characters are created. For this reason, let us grant that
they are invented. Given this, then proper fictional names either refer or they do not refer. But to
what could they possibly refer which exists before the character is invented? Two problems fall
out of the assumption that names used in fictional sentences refer: (a) The absence of constraints
on fictional discourse (as opposed to critical discourse) will complete fictional worlds, thereby
threatening to destroy the theory‟s account of Bifurcation. Fictional worlds cannot be both
complete and incomplete, and if we allow names spoken in both contexts to refer to the same
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Amie Thomasson, Fiction and Metaphysics, (New York: Cambridge, 1998).
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entity, we will be forced to take a stance concerning whether they are complete or incomplete.
Taking this stance will leave abstract realism with the same dilemma that concrete realism
suffered: accommodation of only one side of the Bifurcation. (b) If we grant that proper fictional
names refer before we have given fictional characters any properties, then we have essentially
granted fictional characters souls or substances – what could a name refer to before any
properties are encoded? Only Locke‟s “something I know not what” – yet this directly
contradicts the abstract realist‟s reduction the character to a bundle of properties. Consequently,
we conclude that proper fictional names in fictional sentences do not refer (as one would expect
if the sentence also does not assert). Salmon puts the point succinctly:
[O]ur language licenses a certain kind of metaphysical move. It postulates an abstract artifact, the
fictional character, as a product of this pretense. But the name 'Sherlock Holmes' does not thereby
refer to the character thereby postulated, nor for that matter to anything else, and the sentences
involving the name 'Sherlock Holmes' that were written in creating the fiction express no
propositions, about the fictional character or anything else. They are all part of the pre-tense, like
the actors' lines in the performance of a play. It is only at a later stage when discussing the
fictional character from a standpoint outside of the fiction, speaking about the pretense and not
within it, that the language makes a second move, this one semantical rather than metaphysical,
giving the name a new, non-pretend use as a name for the fictional character (“Nonexistence”
294).

An abstract realist may accommodate this deflationary explication of the engaged context in one
of two ways. Either the abstract realist may use a nominalist strategy to reduce apparently
referring names to some other speech act, or she may lean on pretense (as Salmon does) as a
means of explaining how these sentences do not assert and these names do not refer.
The first alternative has been recently explored in literature about Gappy Proposition
Theory, 17 but we do not intend to explore this option here for the second alternative seems a
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One currently popular method of effecting this nominalist reduction is to use Gappy Proposition Theory. David
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449-69. Nathan Salmon, “Nonexistence,” Noûs, 32, 3 (1998): 277-319, Hereafter cited in text as “Nonexistence”;
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more promising avenue for the abstract realist. What the abstract realist will ultimately need out
of a concept of pretense is a mechanism which can generate structured webs of propositions from
a text full of sentences which are not assertions. The simplest way to accommodate this need is
to formulate the semantic mechanics of pretense in a manner parallel to the semantic mechanics
of assertions: pretend assertions. Though such a concept of pretense seems intuitively plausible,
we leave it to the abstract realist to refine our suggestion and defend it against objection. Out
business is to construct a mentalism, so in the name of this task we will simply outline the
failures and successes of the two forms of augmented modal realism discussed in an effort to
guide and shape our approach toward a satisfying fictional mentalism.
2.3 The Failures and Successes of Augmented Modal Realism
We have seen that concrete realism fails as theory of fiction for three reasons: (a) It
cannot explain the intuition that ficta and fictional worlds are created by the human beings who
imagine them; (b) it cannot distinguish between fiction and non-fiction without imposing ad hoc
constraints; (c) it cannot accommodate both sides of the phenomenon of Bifurcation.
It is because concrete realism falters at (a) that it also falters at (b). Lewis‟ theory cannot
take the concept of pretense as anything more than a mental byproduct of fictional discourse,
because all of the relevant mechanisms are purported to be explained by possible worlds. More
importantly, because nothing is created in fictional discourse, there is no such thing as a pretense.

Semantics of Fictional Names,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 78 (1997): 128-148, Hereafter cited in text as
“Semantics”.
Consider our fictional sentences (1a, 1b). If „Sherlock Holmes‟ and „Rodion Raskolnikov‟ do not refer to any entity
at all, then we must submit that these sentences have a propositional structure with certain positions left empty: (1a)
„__ is a murderer,‟ and (1b) „__ plays the violin.‟ Where we previously had „Sherlock Holmes‟ and „Porfiry
Petrovich‟, we now have gaps in the proposition. The effect that the gaps in these propositions have is to leave the
propositional structure unfilled. We can represent the semantic content of (1a) thus:
<__, being-a-murderer>
As Braun observes, if a name has no semantic content, then the proposition in which it is used will have incomplete
semantic content; thus, gappy propositions are apparently truth-valueless. Hence, under Gappy Proposition Theory,
as construed by Braun, fictional sentences are non-cognitive.
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Rather, that which we naively call „pretense‟ is precisely what Lewis is trying to explain in terms
of possible worlds. It is for this reason that Lewis suggests that when dealing with impossible
worlds, we should expect to have a non-trivial concept of truth “only under the pretence – not to
be taken too seriously – that there are impossible possible worlds as well as the possible possible
worlds” (“Truth in Fiction” 45-6, my emphasis). If Lewis takes the notion of pretense seriously,
then he runs the risk of undermining his whole project: for then possible worlds could be
invented rather than discovered. Without a notion of pretense, Lewis can only connect a written
story to a possible world in one of two ways: either the story is told word-for-word as truth in a
possible world, or it precisely describes the events that occur in a possible world. But if these are
his only options, then, as we have observed, Lewis falls into the dilemma of having either an ad
hoc (and absurd) theory or an infelicitous definition of fiction.
Abstract realism is capable of avoiding all three of the pitfalls through which concrete
realism cannot but fail to navigate. So long as abstract realism adopts the intuition that ficta and
fictional worlds are created and not discovered, as Thomasson suggests that it should, it can
safely navigate pitfalls (b) and (c). If fictional worlds are, indeed, invented, then the abstract
realist is no longer bound rigidly to description or to word-for-word repetition – such an abstract
realist does not need to find a way to match what is already in a (discovered) fictional world with
what is written in the text. The abstract realist may hold, instead, that the propositions which
constitute the world of Crime and Punishment are created by the very act of writing the
sentences which constitute the text. The connection between the fictional world and the
sentences in the text, then, is a purely imaginative connection. Dostoevsky pretended to be
speaking the truth about the world, and this act of imagination generated a set of propositions
which constitute a fictional world. And here we have both sides of the Bifurcation
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accommodated, so in specifically conforming to the intuition in worry (a), the abstract realist is
able to also avoid worries (b) and (c).
We conclude that augmentation of modal realism to fit the purposes of a theory of fiction
is only capable of addressing one side of the Bifurcation. Concrete realism, a pure realism, must
come down one way or another as to whether Conan Doyle imagined a single determinate world
or a set of determinate worlds. Either way, the theory predicts no Bifurcation in Speech – clearly
a false prediction. Abstract realism, if it were a pure realism, would reach a similar impediment.
If engaged speech acts assert and if „Sherlock Holmes1‟ refers abstractly, then either engaged
fictional discourse is identical to disengaged fictional discourse except for an unexplained
constraint on what may be said in the disengaged discourse, or Holmes1 is some other kind of
abstract entity which is unrelated to Holmes2. In the first case the Bifurcation disappears just as
in concrete realism, and in the second case the Bifurcation is so deep that there is no longer any
connection between the engaged discourse and the disengaged.
In this second situation, should it be the case that Holmes1 refers to some new kind of
abstract entity, call it a character1, and Holmes2 refers to another kind of abstract entity, a
character2, then when I say „Dostoevsky‟s character, Raskolnikov, is a murderer,‟ how can I
possibly determine whether I am talking about the character1 or the character2? Perhaps it is
impossible to speak critically about characters1, but why should this be the case since we can
speak descriptively of them? Clearly, these troubles would be more easily managed by deflating
the engaged discourse in order that the abstract realism may use this engaged discourse to
explain how the disengaged discourse becomes inflated.
Our discussion of augmented modal realism has posed us with three potential problems
besetting a theory of fiction and one potential solution to these problems. If concrete realism
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demonstrates the pitfalls that a theory of fiction must be conscious of avoiding, then abstract
realism demonstrates that a deflationary concept of pretense can avoid these pitfalls smoothly.
And it is important that this concept be a concept of pretense, for this is the concept which
allows us to avoid all three pitfalls in one swift maneuver. It is important to keep in mind that we
have not yet deployed a concept of pretense: thus far, we have only a very basic and broad sketch
of pretense, if that. The major stumbling point for abstract realism is the tendency to focus on the
realist discourse (the disengaged discourse), and to neglect the anti-realist discourse (the engaged
discourse). So before abstract realism may be adopted as a viable candidate, pretense theory must
be explored to determine its capacity to support a deflationary discourse. While van Inwagen
believes that this discourse is non-cognitive, we need not assume that pretense must adhere to
this sort of strong anti-realism. And, in fact, we will discover that pretense is actually a
relativistic discourse and is, thus, a weaker form of anti-realism.
Finally, I must stress that nowhere in this essay do I claim to demonstrate that there exists
within abstract realism any problem so great that the theory ought to be abandoned in favor of
another theory. Though I do support a mentalist anti-realism about ficta and fictional worlds
rather than an abstract realism, the task of undermining said abstract realism about ficta and
fictional worlds is a task whose ambition exceeds the boundaries of this essay. While I believe
that such a feat is possible, I will simply confine my comments to a sketch of this project in my
concluding chapter. Because the major theme of this essay is a philosophically constructive essay
– an effort to produce and polish a theory of ficta and fictional worlds – we will allow these
comments concerning abstract realism to suffice for our purposes.
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CHAPTER 3. PRETENSE THEORY
3.1 Waltonian Pretense Theory
Our exploration of augmented modal realism has brought us to the conclusion that a pure
modal realism – concrete realism – falls prey to three major criticisms, the foremost of these is
the complete shunning of one side of the Bifurcation. A hybrid between modal realism and some
sort of pretense theory seems prima facie plausible, based on our account of abstract realism.
Therefore we will lay out a pretense theory beginning, again, with Walton‟s account.
Though Walton does not seem to be aware that the abstract realist posits a realist/antirealist hybrid in order to explain fictional discourse, he does explicitly develop a deflationary
concept of pretense:
It is my contention … that when realists claim with a straight face that people refer to and talk
about fictional entities and that our theory must postulate them in order to make sense of what
people say, they are overlooking or underemphasizing the element of make-believe that lies at the
heart of the institution. They mistake the pretense of referring to fictions, combined with a serious
interest in this pretense, for genuine ontological commitment (Mimesis 390).

Throughout Mimesis as Make-Believe, Walton stresses the fact that when we concern ourselves
with fiction, we are participating in an elaborate pretense. We imagine the world to be a way
that, in reality, it is not. Just as we imagined ourselves to be cops and robbers in childhood, so
now we imagine ourselves to be in nineteenth century Russia observing the psychological fits
that a certain dropout student acquaintance of ours is experiencing after committing his first
murder.
While Walton‟s concept of fiction certainly revolves around the imagination, it also
incorporates that which is not imagined: props. For Walton, “props generate fictional truths
independently of what anyone does or does not imagine,” and this is because the rules of the
fictional world – the “principles of generation” as Walton calls them – dictate that a certain kind
of prop is to be treated thus-and-so whether or not the prop actually prompts anyone to imagine a
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pretense (Mimesis 38). Walton‟s simplest example of a game of make-believe is a pretense in
which two children (call them Timmy and Tommy) agree that all tree stumps count as bears. It
turns out that there is a “bear” lurking in the forest just a ten feet behind them, but they do not
know this and so they do not imagine it, because they have not seen the tree stump which lies ten
feet behind them. So while a prop can generate a fictionally true proposition, it cannot generate
the principles by which that proposition is made fictionally true – these principles are supplied
by those doing the imagining. It is also worth commenting, at least in passing, that an event or an
action can do the same work as a prop. So if Timmy pokes a tree stump with a stick, it is
fictionally true that a bear has been wounded, assuming that a stick counts as a spear. Essentially,
Walton‟s theory of pretense tells us that real world actions and objects generate truths within a
pretense by virtue of the relevant principles accepted by those persons participating in the
pretense. According to Walton there are only two tools involved in collaborative imaginings:
props and principles (Mimesis 39-43). And these principles – agreed upon by all who participate
in the game of make-believe – are what generate the fictional world from the bare materials of
props and events.
The distinction between props and principles already supports the Bifurcation in a robust
way, for any feature – any fictional truth – that we imagine within a fictional world which is not
implied by at least one principle and at least one prop is necessarily private to us (unless we
speak it). So if Tommy starts using rocks to kill bears while Timmy has no idea what rocks are
supposed to be in the pretense, Tommy is either cheating in order to kill bears or he is
participating in a pretense whose principles are private to Tommy alone. If Timmy and Tommy
were pretending to fight against each other, cheating threatens to become a major problem.
Should Tommy, who likes to invent principles of generation, invoke the infamous “force-field”
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principle which essentially guarantees invincibility, Timmy is likely to respond that force-fields
are not allowed in this game. If Tommy refuses to relinquish the force-field principle, the game
will be over because a set of principles could not be agreed upon. The disengaged side of the
Bifurcation is accommodated by the fact that not just any principle is acceptable in the game of
make-believe. The engaged side, on the other hand, is accommodated by the fact that Tommy
may still adopt any set of principles he likes, but this lack of constraint entails that Tommy‟s
game will not be a collaborative game of make-believe.
Walton draws the analogy that “what is true is to be believed; what is fictional is to be
imagined” (Mimesis 41, and that which is “fictional” in Walton‟s vocabulary is identical to that
which is “fictionally true”). Thus, if we are aware of the principles by which a prop is intended to
generate a fictional truth, then the prop constitutes a prescription to imagine the fictional truth,
where “a fictional truth consists in there being a prescription or mandate in some context to
imagine something” (Mimesis 39). If you and I both read Crime and Punishment, there are nontrivial ways in which we imagine the same things. Though Dostoevsky never explicitly mentions
it, we generally assume that one day when Raskolnikov is released from Siberia, he and Sofia
will live happily ever after (or something like it). The convergence in our imaginative constructs
concerning an issue which is only hazily implicit in the text itself will be well explained by
reading the normativity implicit in accepted principles of generation into Dostoevsky‟s
description of the world he imagined.
3.2 Fictionalist Pretense Theory
Stuart Brock defend a “fictionalism about fictional characters” which borrows the
framework of Waltonian pretense theory with the intention of using it to explain fictional
discourse. Like a fictionalist about any other discourse, his method is to propose the
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characteristic fictionalist reduction: “to borrow the realist‟s paraphrase P, without embracing it,
and to paraphrase [fictional and critical sentences] instead as „according to the realist‟s
hypothesis, P‟” (“Fictionalism” 9). This method is supposed to secure an interpretation of our
three classes of sentences that is every bit as functional as any realist interpretation, but without
all the ontological commitment. So the added benefit of this interpretation is that the fictional
fictionalist is able to interpret one of the three classes literally: the existential class. To borrow
Brock‟s interpretations,
Existential statements are to be treated straightforwardly; they contain no implicit prefix. Fictional
statements are statements which are elliptical for claims about the content of a literary fiction.
Finally, critical statements are statements about the content of the realist‟s theory of fictional
characters (“Fictionalism” 9).

Anthony Everett, another fictionalist about ficta, makes use of pretense theory to explain
critical and fictional sentences in a slightly more sophisticated way.18 For Everett, fictional
sentences are direct imaginative pretenses in which, for example, Dostoevsky imagines the world
to be such that Raskolnikov is a murderer, and when we read Crime and Punishment we enter
into that same pretense. Everett refers to fictional sentences as P1 pretenses, and critical
sentences, or P2 pretenses, are characterized in terms of P1 pretenses:
A P2 pretense involves our engaging in a P1 pretense in which we pretend that the world is as it is
portrayed in the relevant text and, in particular, that it contains various individuals who have the
sorts of properties ascribed to them by that text. But, in addition to this, it will also involve us
pretending that these individuals have the sorts of properties which fictional realists attribute to
fictional characters. We should, in short, pretend that these individuals have a dual nature
(“Against Fictional Realism” 640).

So when I assent to analytic critical sentences like „Rodion Raskolnikov is an archetypal
character,‟ I am betraying the P1 pretense in which we all engage by describing Raskolnikov as
an “archetypal character” – for within the fictional world, Raskolnikov is not a character at all:
he is a person. For the fictional fictionalist, however, another pretense is involved in critical
18

Anthony Everett, “Against Fictional Realism,” Journal of Philosophy, 102 (2005): 624-49. Hereafter cited in text
as “Against Fictional Realism”.
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discourse. Where the abstract realist only invokes pretense theory to explain fictional sentences,
the fictional fictionalist invokes pretense theory to explain both fictional sentences and critical
sentences. Because it is the abstract realist‟s paraphrase which is borrowed as a pretense for the
critical discourse, the abstract realist‟s pretense account of fictional discourse is also
expropriated in full. The two pretenses – the abstract realist‟s pretense about persons, and the
fictionalist‟s pretense about characters (posited by the abstract realist outside of the fictional
pretense) – are distinct from each other in fictional fictionalism, for the pretense adopted from a
disengaged stance, the realist‟s pretense, pretends within it that there also exist persons (who do
not actually exist). Clearly, for the fictional fictionalist, the fictional pretense is parasitic upon
the critical pretense, for it is within the critical pretense that the fictional occurs. So in addition to
the pretense in which Raskolnikov is thought of as a person, I am engaging in a second pretense
– the realist‟s pretense – which pretends that there exist such things as characters, plots and other
entities posited by critical fictional discourse.
The primary difference between Everett‟s treatment and Brock‟s is that Everett is aware
that switching back and forth between pretenses is unavoidable in critical fictional discourse.
Everett‟s distinction between P1 and P2 pretenses echoes the conclusion that we reached earlier in
response to Sorenson‟s fictional sorites paradox: the dual nature of fictional characters is another
way of describing the Bifurcation in Speech. The existence of fiction sorites paradoxes showed
us that we cannot escape the essential difference between speaking about the Sherlock Holmes
who is a man in the fictional pretense, and the Sherlock Holmes who is merely a character in the
critical pretense. Consequently, a fictional fictionalist‟s interpretation of the three classes of
sentences must distinguish between three usages of „Holmes‟. Let „Holmes1‟ indicate a reference
to Holmes in a P1 pretense and „Holmes2‟ indicate a reference to Holmes in a P2 pretense. In the
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first usage, we pretend Holmes is a person and in the second usage we pretend that Holmes is a
character. We will use „Holmes‟ without a subscript to indicate reference to both fictional
entities: the person and the character. This last usage is reserved for existential sentences which
operate entirely outside of any pretense. Thus:
Interpretation under Fictional Fictionalism
(F1) (a″′) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer in wCP.
(b″′) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin in wSH.
(F2) (a″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-cleverdetective to x degree; whereas Porfiry Petrovich2 encodes being-a-clever-detective
to y degree of cleverness, and x > y.
(b″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-famousdetective to x degree of famousness, and x is greater than the degree of famousness
to which any real person exemplifies being-a-famous-detective.
(c″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal bundle
of human properties.
(F3) (a″′) Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist.
(b″′) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
Steven Yablo has invented a similar semantic apparatus which he uses to extend pretense
fictionalism to all realist discourses, fictional discourse included.19 This mechanism underlies
what Yablo describes figuralism – a reflexive pretense theory which Yablo intends to be
understood as being analogous (if not identical) to figurative speech. He begins with an
examination of the truth conditions for any sentences interpreted literally in the English
language:
Now, the rules of English make their contribution roughly like so. The rules tell us which sentences are true
under which worldly conditions. If K is a condition sufficient by R‟s lights for the truth of S, we write RK ≥
S. If K is necessary by R‟s lights for the truth of S, we write R K ≤ S. RK = S then means that K is exactly
what is needed for S to come out true, where truth is judged according to R (“Go Figure” 76).

If a sentence S is true within the context of a rule R given condition K, then the literal content of
S is K, for K is what fixes the truth value of S. Yablo interprets this mechanism in terms of
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pretense. Thus, the real content of a fictional sentence S is the K which makes S true under a
pretense F. Hence we have,
(11) realcontent(S) = (the K such that FK = S).
Yablo uses logarithm notation to express this formula:
(12) realcontent(S) = logF(S) = K.
His examples of the formula in action are as follows:
(13) logF-Number(the number of E‟s = n) = there are n E’s.
(14) logF-Modal(there is a world such that H) = possibly H.
(15) logF-Property(x has Q-ness) = x is Q.
The key notion is that logF(S) is the fact that makes S fictional, and not the fact that makes it
true. If S were true, it would not be a fictional sentence. Suppose that S is: „There is a world such
that H.‟ In assenting to this sentence, we are effectively assenting to the truth of the proposition
that „S is fictional,‟ and the content of the sentence is possibly H. What is curious about this
formula is that F is a variable, so there is not, in principle, only one fiction under which any
given sentence is true. This suggests that the meaning of a sentence is not fixed to any given
fictional world. Yablo takes this to mean that the meaning of sentences within a pretense is
independent of that pretense (though, seemingly not independent of any pretense).
Yablo tinkers with this apparatus numerous times throughout his essay to end up with a
concept of pretense which is very similar to Everett‟s, so we will simply limit our mention of
Yablo‟s brand of fictionalism to his conclusion: all cases of figurative speech are, in fact, cases
of fictional discourse. Hence, when I say that I have butterflies in my stomach, I am not inviting
questions as to what kind of butterflies they are; I am speaking a sentence according to a fiction,
and that sentence‟s interpretation is constrained by the rules of that fiction:
(16) logF-Butterfly(there are butterflies in my stomach) = my nervousness is upsetting my
stomach.
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In Waltonian terms, logF-Butterfly() is a principle of generation. „my nervousness is upsetting my
stomach‟ is the real world event which the principles of generation connects to the fictional truth
„there are butterflies in my stomach‟. Consequently, insofar as a fiction is figurative, the real
world content that is expressed in the fiction count as the conditions which make the fiction
fictional. Prima facie, this seems to be a problematic account of fiction. A figuralist fictionalist
assumes that there is some real-world content to every fictional story – that is the figuralist
assumes that every story has a “moral”. Such a strong claim might fall prey to fantasies devised
for the sake of pure entertainment. Nevertheless, intuition tells us that if a story has no
connection to the real world, we would not be able to comprehend the story. Incorporating
figuralism into Walton‟s account, we find that the moral of the story – the real-world content
which renders a figurative sentence fictionally true – apparently acts as the prop in a work of
fiction. But if this were the case, then the literary critic‟s primary concern would be with props.
The real content of a figurative sentence is not the prop which generates the fiction, for the tree
stump is not part the real content of the make-believe game that Timmy and Tommy are playing.
What Yablo is concerned with when he describes the real content of a figurative sentence is
meaning. Based on this notion, we can extend our concept of pretense a bit further: A pretense is
generated from principles which prescribe certain imaginings which are built upon real-world
props, and the meaning of this pretense is the real-world content which is figuratively
represented.
What, then, does Timmy‟s and Tommy‟s game of make-believe mean? This question is
actually a mistaken question, for Timmy and Tommy play for fun, without any notion of
meaning. They are exercising their capacities for imagination, they are enjoying entertainment.
This suggests that figurative speech is actually a subset of fiction, rather than the other way
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around. There is, however, meaning in Crime and Punishment, and the benefit of Yablo‟s
pretense mechanism is that it explains how it is that Crime and Punishment has meaning.
But there is still one last question that must be answered: in our narrow case of canonical
works of fiction, what are the principles and what are the props? What real world objects and
events generate truths within a fiction as outlined by what rules? Walton‟s view on the matter is
that a typical fictional text (like Crime and Punishment) is a representation: it describes a
fictional world imagined by the author and prescribed to the reader (Mimesis 353-5). The
description – the text – might be taken as a long string of principles about how we are to imagine
(viz. in what order we are to imagine, in what language we are to imagine, borrowing which
actual objects as further props, etc.), for it is the text that constrains our imagination in the
disengaged context, just as it is the principles of generation that constrain our imagination in a
game of make-believe.
What, then, is the prop? One might think that the prop is the book itself, but the book
itself is a very poor device for serving as a prop. It would not serve very well to imagine the
book to be a bear, or a spear, or Raskolnikov himself. Perhaps it will help to consider an artwork
similar to a work of fiction: theatre. In an instance of Shakespeare‟s Othello, actors, actresses,
clothing, sets, fake swords, and all the words and deeds of the actors and actresses function as
props. The principles of generation, on the other hand, were written as parentheticals in the
original text, and they were meant not to be spoken, but followed by the director. Consequently,
the principles by which our make-believe game of Othello is generated are united with the props
which generate truths according to those principles within our game.
Based on an analogy with theatre, we might think that that the text is, after all, both a
prop and a set of principles. But let us resist this thought. If, in a work of fiction, what is to be
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imagined is an entire world, then the most natural prop to imagine as this fictional world is the
actual world. Consequently, the events and objects which constitute the actual world become a
prescription to imagine a fictional world in which actual objects and events (such as Petersburg,
London, Napoleon‟s reign, etc.) are linked to the objects and events within our pretense via the
text of the fiction we are reading.
The need to secure a set of props in the actual world becomes even more urgent when we
consider that the experience of an imaginative construct is private. As such, if we are to have a
meaningful conversation about a fictional world, or if we are to have some means of
collaborating in an act of make-believe, then we will need some way to know that we are talking
about the same things. But for those of us who have never been to Petersburg, Russia, a
sufficiently robust set of props which fix the propositions that are true in the world of Crime and
Punishment will be hard to find. In fact, it is not the actual Petersburg which serves as a prop in
Crime and Punishment, for if it were the book could only be read in Petersburg! Rather, it is the
reader‟s impression of Petersburg which serves as a prop. Consequently, our earlier conclusion
missed the mark: it is not the actual world which serves as a prop for a fictional world, but our
impression of the actual world. Dostoevsky‟s work gives us a set of principles by which we are
prescribed to configure our impressions of the real world in order to produce the fictional that is
Crime and Punishment. So although Walton‟s phenomenology has given us a useful description
of the act of make-believe, it does not answer our questions about the ontology of pretense; it
merely converts the question into one concerning imagination and impression. We are apparently
lead to a mentalism about pretense – still an anti-realism, but not the kind of anti-realism that the
pretense theorists expected. However, we must stave off this path of inquiry for the moment, in
favor of raising doubts about pretense theory – for there are doubts to be had.
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3.3 Objections to Pretense Theory
3.3.1 No Systematic Set of Principles of Generation
There are five objections to pretense theory which I want to consider. The first four are
objections raised by Jason Stanley,20 and the last is my own. Each of these objections will be
answered within the purview of this essay – some in the present section and others in later
sections. Ultimately, I take these objections to demonstrate that pretense theory, as expounded
above, is insufficient to the task of a theory of fiction, though its failure suggests that a
mentalism which borrows many of the features of pretense theory may succeed where pretense
fails.
The first objection is an objection to the apparent ubiquity of figurative speech according
to the figuralist. If fictional discourse is to be interpreted figuratively, then all expressions are,
effectively, idioms: each figurative expression is to be understood in terms of its own principles
of generation, and these are not reducible to a systematic set of principles. Stanley observes that
even Walton apparently agrees on this point: ““It is fictional that I speak truly in saying „N
doesn‟t exist‟ if N-ish attempts to refer fail, for whatever reason.”21 If negative existential
sentences fail to refer, then even these apparently literal sentences are figurative, which suggests
that any discourse which has the trappings of literality may be at bottom figurative.
Figurative interpretation of apparently literal discourses is problematic because
compositional semantic theories (in which the semantic value of the parts of a sentence fix the
semantic value of the entire sentence) have been seen as solving a major intuitive problem. We
somehow have the ability to understand unique sentences with which we have no previous
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familiarity; furthermore, in discourses such as mathematics, we have no reason to think that the
sentences used are not compositional. In addition to these worries, if there were no systematic set
of principles of generation, our ability to understand new and unique sentences would suggest
that we already know an infinite set of principles of generation. As Stanley has it, "The
importance of compositional semantic theories is that they answer a mystery about linguistic
understanding: how can a finite mind grasp the real world truth-conditions of an indefinite
number of new sentences?" (“Hermeneutic Fictionalism” 44).
Despite the figuralist fictionalist‟s commitment to a figurative treatment of the existential
class of sentences, this fact does not entail that all apparently literal discourses are to be treated
figuratively. In discourses such as mathematics, what is interpreted figuratively is the basic
pretense, the P2 pretense. According to this pretense, what is pretended – what is spoken
figuratively – is that there are such things as numbers. But this figurative treatment of
mathematics is nothing more than the existential class of sentences which are relevant to the
mathematical fiction. Consequently, we have reason to believe that the only kind of apparently
literal sentences which are to be interpreted figuratively is the existential class of sentences.
Sentences which occur in the mathematic P1 pretense are to be interpreted compositionally,
within the pretense that there are such things as numbers. Similarly, a compositional treatment of
traditional fictional discourse may be had (if needed), though only within the basic pretense that
there are such things as ficta. Thus, there can be a systematic set of principles of generation in P1
pretenses.
3.3.2 Pretense Theory Is Apparently Not Hermeneutic
The second objection assumes the success of the first objection. According to this
objection, if all fictional discourse is figurative – that is, if there is no composition semantic
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theory which can fit into figuralist fictionalism – and there is no discourse which is interpreted
literally, then apparently figuralist fictionalism is revolutionary and not hermeneutic.
Hermeneutic fictionalism about discourse D claims that all sentences spoken in D already
function as the fictionalist claims they do. That is, the hermeneutic fictionalist thinks of herself
as describing what we already do. The revolutionary fictionalist, on the other hand, admits that
sentences in D entail ontological commitments, but that we should cease to speak this way and
adopt the fictionalist‟s ontologically lighter structure. Consequently, given that the figuralist
fictionalist must interpret apparently literal sentences figuratively, it appears that – despite his
claim otherwise – the hermeneutic fictionalist is actually a revolutionary fictionalist. This
objection is relevant to our purposes for two reasons: (a) the first and most fundamental function
of pretense theory is to describe what we already do when we speak fictional sentences: a
hermeneutic project; (b) the hermeneutic is the more compelling position of the two.
While this objection is contingent upon the first objection, which we believe can be
adequately met, the question whether fictional fictionalism is revolutionary or hermeneutic is a
relevant one, so let us not forget this particular complaint.
3.3.3 No First-Person Authority Concerning Beliefs
"Consider hermeneutic fictionalism about arithmetic. Competent users of arithmetical
discourse will certainly deny that they are pretending when they discuss arithmetic. In such
cases, the hermeneutic fictionalist must maintain that the fact that the language user is pretending
is not accessible to her, even in principle" (“Hermeneutic Fictionalism” 46). Similarly, we may
say that competent users of the English language deny that they are pretending when they speak
negative existential sentences about ficta. But the figuralist claims that there is a basic pretense
involved in the sentence „Sherlock Holmes does not exist,‟ namely the pretense that there is such
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a thing as Sherlock Holmes about which we can speak. Stanley observes that "this introduces a
novel and quite drastic form of failure of first-person authority over one‟s own mental states"
(“Hermeneutic Fictionalism” 47).
This claim, however, seems relatively trivial: the white-power supremacist is not aware
of being a bigot; the fundamentalist is not aware of being closed-minded; many Nazis were not
aware that Jews were human beings. Stanley admits that such a failure of first-person authority
concerning beliefs is akin to Freudian psychological repression, but his objection to such an
interpretation is confoundingly weak: “[the hermeneutic fictionalist] probably does not wish to
commit herself to the view that the non-introspectible nature of … pretense is due to childhood
trauma. The hermeneutic fictionalist about arithmetic certainly should avoid defending the view
that arithmetic is a mass neurosis” (“Hermeneutic Fictionalism” 47). I see no reason why we
should assume that repression is universally caused by childhood repression, except out of
respect for Freud as an authority concerning matters psychological. Furthermore, the
hermeneutic fictionalist ultimately does claim that realism about arithmetic (and consequently
also realism about ficta) is a mass neurosis. Stanley has apparently supported his objection with a
word-game. He has equivocated between the discourse of arithmetic (and fiction) and realism
about the discourse of arithmetic (and fiction). The hermeneutic fictionalist surely should not
hold that the first is a neurosis, but holding that the second is a neurosis is really quite trivial
considering that the realist likely holds that the hermeneutic fictionalist position concerning these
discourses is also a neurosis.
3.3.4 Susceptibility to Empirical Defeat
Autistic persons do not participate in games of make-believe because they do not
understand the purpose of them, but they do participate in apparently non-figurative discourses
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such as mathematics. Stanley observes that the pretense theorist may maintain that an autistic
person can still do mathematics because they take themselves to be speaking literally and not
figuratively. But if this is the case, Stanley complains, then it seems that there are different
psychological processes are involved in make-believe than are involved in mathematics.
Supposing that there are different psychological processes involved in make-believe than are
involved in mathematics, our reasons for grandfathering mathematics into the context of makebelieve seem to be undercut.
This objection does not seem to have direct relevance to the fictional fictionalist, but
there is indirect relevance. If there is an anti-realist concept of fiction available to the fictionalist,
then it is this concept of fiction upon which the fictionalist must lean in supporting her broader
project of explaining all apparently ontologically committal theories in terms of fictionalism. In
short, a good and forward-thinking anti-realist will want her theory of fiction to be sufficiently
robust to support all the uses to which she may later put the theory. Consequently, we will want
to preserve the possibility of an unproblematic notion of mathematical fictionalism.
If we have been able successfully to meet objection #1, then we may meet this objection
equally successfully. In our response to objection #1, we observed that Stanley does not respect
the distinction between P1 and P2 pretenses, or engaged and disengaged pretenses, respectively.
In an engaged pretense, we assume a pretend ontology which is granted to us in the disengaged
pretense, and within this ontology we maintain compositional semantics for discourses which are
apparently compositional. That is, some discourses are figurative only in the disengaged context;
whereas, other discourses are figurative in both the engaged and the disengaged context. Thus,
the difficulty that autistic persons have lies in the figurative engaged or P1 pretenses. Such an
autistic person can apparently only engage in P1 pretenses which are non-figurative. However he
47

will be able to engage in P2 pretenses which are figurative. But such an autistic person would
apparently have no first-person access to this P2 pretense, because he does not understand its
figurative nature. Thus, the autistic mathematician is stuck in the realist neurosis concerning
mathematics.
3.3.5 Question-Begging Ontology
It is not enough to simply claim to be able to borrow a realist interpretation and reject
realist ontologies of ficta. Intuition suggests to us that there is something amiss in this way of
thinking.22 If we accept Occam‟s razor as a basic principle, then the reason that the realist adopts
his ontology of ficta (whether concrete or abstract) is entirely for the sake of the explanation.23
Fictional fictionalism, on the other hand, tells us that we can have the fictional cake and eat it
too. Brock has downplays the fact that the concept of fictionalism presupposes the concept of
fiction in favor of using it to generate interpretations of the three classes of sentences. For if the
realist‟s paraphrase is itself a fiction, then Brock‟s paraphrase should really be worded:
„according to the realist‟s fiction, P.‟ Thus, fictional entities and fictional worlds are themselves
fictions, and so much is suggested by Brock himself: “one could hardly be a realist about
fictional characters on the one hand, and a[n anti-realist] fictionalist about some alternative
metaphysical theory, T, on the other” (“Fictionalism” 11). We will have to be very careful in
dealing with a notion like this, for at all junctures we run the risk of begging the question against
ourselves by assuming a concept of fiction in our definition of the concept of fiction.
Does Yablo‟s pretense mechanism advance us toward the fictional fictionalist‟s goal of
ontological emptiness? Not yet, but he is headed in the right direction. He has created a
paraphrase of sentences that seem to entail the existence of an entity which transforms them into
22

And so does Quine, who “deplore[s] the philosophical double talk, which would repudiate an ontology while
simultaneously enjoying its benefits" Word and Object, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1960), 242.
23
Though in practice this is probably not always the only motivation.
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sentences that entail only the existence of a fiction. Ficta, as we supposed earlier, piggyback
upon fictions. Yablo also comes to the conclusion that a bifurcation in speech is necessitated
when using fictions: an anti-realist sentence like “the number of numbers is 0” cannot be
reconciled without assuming an equivocation (“Go Figure” 80). Thus, the first instance of
„number‟ occurs within the fiction (and is thus spoken in an engaged fashion) and the second
instance occurs without (and thus spoken in a disengaged fashion). But, as we have stressed
numerous times throughout this essay, the Bifurcation is not an explanation; it is a fact that needs
explaining.
When we speak in a disengaged fashion, we play but a single language game, and we
interact with our fiction from the safe confines of our (presumably nominalist) meta-language.
Yablo calls this a basic language game: “G is basic if acceptability in G is a function of how
things really are” (“Go Figure” 83). But when we engage in the pretense – when we speak about
fictions from within – we must play a new language game which is parasitic upon the first: “G*
is parasitic if acceptability in G* depends on how things are imagined to be when playing some
other game (as it might be, G)” (“Go Figure” 83). In order to play a fictional language game, we
must first know both the extent to which it is fictional and the rules which govern the game.
When we say that „numbers do not exist‟, we are playing a basic language game: we pretend that
there are such things as numbers, and we state that they do not exist. But when we say that „the
number of numbers is 0‟, we are playing both a basic and a parasitic language game: the first
usage of “number” occurs within the parasitic language game – the game of mathematics which
explores the relationship of numbers to each other; the second usage of “number” occurs within
the basic language game – the Platonist game which pretends that there exist such things as
numbers. So in the basic language game, we relate the fiction to the actual world; in a parasitic
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language game, we participate in the fiction, assuming that in the background there lies another
language game which relates the game to the actual world.
The bifurcated within/without engaged/disengaged structure of figuralism or fiction (as
you prefer) is a fact that is embedded in the human practice of creating fictions and using figures
of speech. Again, this fact existed prior to philosophy, so it is a fact that needs explaining. In “Go
Figure,” Yablo progressively works toward this figurative model in his attempt to invent a form
of fictionalism which is sufficiently robust to be able to explain away all ontological claims that
a fictionalism might want to explain. What Yablo downplays in this inventive process is that he
is relying, the entire time, on a concept of fiction: according to Yablo, the fact that the use of
modal logic entails the existence of possible worlds is the very fact that makes the sentence
“there are possible worlds” fictional, rather than true. The only context in which a fictional
sentence is true is within the fiction, and this only occurs if the discourse in which the sentences
is used approves of the sentence. In other words, anytime we seem to be incurring the existence
of some entity in our speech, we are really creating for ourselves a simulation, a fantasy, a
fiction, in which these entities exist – we are not required to believe that these entities exist
beyond the fiction.
In order to understand the different levels of pretense, it will be useful to bring in
Carnap‟s internal/external distinction: the entities entailed by a discourse exist only internal to
the discourse; whereas, externally, the discourse and its entities are but a pretense. So, again, of
what does a pretense consist? I submit that we have a reason to reject the notion that there are no
external claims involved in fictionalist explanations. Let us begin with the discourse of physical
science. The facts experienced about the material world are explained beautifully – though not
completely – by the scientific model of the material world. We may, if we like, construe the
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scientific model as a pretense, but the structure of pretenses requires that any participant in the
scientific pretense must at the same time admit the existence of something external to the
pretense in order to distinguish the pretense as such, namely: the material world which is
modeled by the scientific pretense. In taking the scientific model as a pretense, we believe in the
existence of such entities as electrons and quarks only insofar as this belief aids our
understanding of the material world. I.e. we pretend that the material world is composed of these
entities. But in so pretending, we have already assumed Carnaps distinction: Our commitment to
the belief that quarks exist is entirely internal, for it is subject to change in the case that it fails as
an explanation of what we take to be external to the pretense.
Carnap‟s distinction will, however, drop out if I take scientific discourse as constitutive
of the material world: in the absence of pretense, there is no Bifurcation. So it is only insofar as I
am aware that the language game I am playing is only a game or a pretense, that a question of
externality has any relevance. If I do not even know that I am participating in a pretense, I will
approach my subject with a seriousness reserved for the external. So, for example, in the case
that you tell me that you have butterflies in your stomach and I do not realize that you are
speaking figuratively, I might ask you why you ate butterflies. In asking this, I am ignoring both
language games, not merely the external language game. This is what is known as ruining the
game or killing the joke. Accordingly, Carnap‟s internal/external distinction constitutes the
necessary and sufficient conditions for an act of pretense and is therefore integral to the notion of
pretense. So while our scientific explanation of the material world (if we accept figuralist
fictionalism) need not demand any external obligations concerning material entities, it does
demand external obligations concerning pretenses about material entities. If it is one of the
defining marks of an imaginative construct that it has no features other than those that are
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necessary for the explanatory use to which it is put (e.g. an electron has “no hairs” as the
physicists say), then phenomenon of pretense seems to escape its own rubric! Whatever it is that
a fiction or pretense is, this (possibly abstract) entity seems to be more of a discovery than an
invention. This, however, is still only an intuition – the intuition that it is not enough to simply
describe a piece of empirical data on the one hand and then to claim that it has no source on the
other.
Suppose our pretense theorist desires to evade an external ontological commitment to
pretenses. He will be inclined to construe the internal/external distinction in terms of pretenses:
the only thing external to a pretense is – you guessed it – yet another pretense. However, every
pretense is built upon the internal/external divide, so if our theorist seeks to explain a pretense
with a pretense, he has a dilemma on his hands: either there is a regress of pretenses (whether
circular or linear), or there is a master-pretense which defies the internal/external bifurcation.
In the first case, we are committed to the existence of a web of pretenses, and we are
hopelessly caught in this web. For example, when I say that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, I am
pretending that there is such a person. External to this pretense is the pretense that there are
characters. External to this pretense is the pretense that there are pretenses. And so on.
In the second case, we truncate the regress by invoking ad hoc the existence of a masterpretense which does not rest upon an internal/external distinction. This move does not seem to be
any different from claiming that there is an external world (the master-pretense), and in it there
exist pretenses (subordinate pretenses). In both cases, we have what looks and feels like an
external ontology of pretense. This act of placing pretense at the heart of all experience will lead
us to a conclusion similar to Descartes‟ cogito: “I pretend, therefore I am” or, to construe the
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claim in a less question-begging fashion, “There is pretending”. And this is an ontological claim
if there ever was one.
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CHAPTER 4. COLLINGWOODIAN MENTALISM
4.1 Naive Mentalism
Our goal is to construct an anti-realist ontology of fiction which is consistent with
Walton‟s concept of fiction as pretense/make-believe. Based on our consideration of fictional
fictionalism, pretense and make-believe theory entail some sort of ontology – namely an
ontology of pretense. Similarly, Walton‟s notions of principles of generation and props, once
applied to works of fiction, rely on imaginative impressions of the actual world. Both of these
consequences suggest that pretense theory – must be bolstered by a mentalism. I should first
make sure it is clear that, minimally, anti-realism (as defined in this essay) entails only that
sentences in a discourse are not true (or false) independent of human cognition – it does not
entail the nonexistence of truth-making entities. The silence of pretense theorists on this issue
implies that an anti-realist theory of fiction somehow assumes the nonexistence of pretenses, but
this position is unnecessarily extreme. The mind-dependence of pretenses need not suggest
nonexistence, but if we do reject the nonexistence of pretenses, then we must adopt a theory
under which a pretense exists as mental construct – a thought. Our mentalism begins with the
claim that a fictional world is a pretense and a pretense exists in a human mind as a complex
thought.
First, our mentalism will borrow the semantic machinery that fictional fictionalism uses
to reduce all ontological questions to questions about pretenses – questions about entire fictional
worlds. This entails that we maintain Yablo‟s and Everett‟s notion that pretenses or fictional
worlds are reflexive and come in pairs (at least): one an ontological pretense in which all the
necessary critical entities are posited, and one a fictional pretense in which a world like ours is
posited.
54

The intuition of creativity can be accommodated simply and appealingly, for all mental
constructs are created by the person who imagines them.
The intuition that the negative existentials are to be interpreted literally can only be
handled by mentalism if “existence” is taken to mean “realist existence” or “mind independent
existence”. Because ficta piggyback upon fictional worlds, all the ficta which populate Sherlock
Holmes‟ fictional world exist – but only in the mind of the reader. This explanation of „Sherlock
Holmes does not exist‟ is still faithful to the spirit of the sentence, because my Holmes does not
exist for anyone but me. So anyone who speaks the sentence „Sherlock Holmes does not exist‟
speaks it for the sake of those who hear it, and not for her own sake. Such an interpretation of
negative existentials completely eliminates the problem of empty names (which is tied to the first
objection raised by Stanley against pretense theory), because all empty names can be reduced to
names which refer to mentalistic ficta.
One of intuitions involved in the Bifurcation of Speech suggests to us that within
Sherlock Holmes‟ fictional world, Holmes has a definite number of hairs on his head. In fact, the
entire world is uniquely determined, because Sherlock, or Mycroft, or Watson can empirically
verify whatever it is that the texts have left underdetermined or elliptical, for they are the ones
who inhabit the world. That is, within the pretense of Holmes‟ world, the number of hairs on
Holmes‟ head can theoretically be counted. While this intuition persists, it is one that a mentalist
anti-realist cannot accommodate: if ficta and fictional worlds exist only in human cognition, then
they are limited by the finitude of the human mind. The fact that we have this intuition must be
explained away by our ontology.
In our literary criticism of Crime and Punishment, the incompleteness that we experience
is a direct result of our intended faithfulness to the fictional world which Dostoevsky established
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(described, represented) within the text itself. It is likely that Dostoevsky imagined Raskolnikov
to have a face, and that this face had distinct features in Dostoevsky‟s mind. This does not entail
that the face of Raskolnikov is incomplete in the fictional world, because a mere act of
imagination can provide Raskolnikov with a face; rather, the face of Raskolnikov is incomplete
in Dostoevsky‟s depiction of the fictional world that he had in mind (in which Raskolnikov
likely had a face). When I read Crime and Punishment, I cannot help but imagine Raskolnikov to
be a gangly man with a face whose features are markedly attractive but sharply defined. When I
imagine the thick eyebrows, thin lips, average ears and close-cropped black hair, I am filling in
the details that Dostoevsky left out for the sake of brevity. I do not intend to do violence to
Dostoevsky‟s vision, so when I engage in critical discussion I do not mention the features that I
have projected onto Raskolnikov‟s face. Instead, I mention the properties that Dostoevsky either
explicitly or implicitly ascribed to Raskolnikov in the text. The fact that the Raskolnikov that I
imagine is different from the Raskolnikov that Dostoevsky imagined or the Raskolnikov that you
imagine is not problematic, because there is an enormous catalogue of features that the two
Raskolnikovs can share: viz. those features which have been left unmentioned in the text itself.
According to our naïve mentalism, when I say „Raskolnikov‟ I refer to something
completely different from what you refer to when you say „Raskolnikov‟. While our references
differ, the degree to which your pretense is similar to my pretense is just the degree to which
Dostoevsky left the description of his pretense incomplete. This is why I am not upset when you
tell me “No, that‟s not how I pictured him at all!” Thus, the difference between my pretense and
your pretense is trivial as far as the actual text is concerned. Therefore, let us tentatively say that
ficta are mentalia whose trivial properties are purely subjective and whose important properties
have been specified as deemed appropriate by the author. And many of the unspecified features
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of Crime and Punishment can be easily filled in by analysis of the culture in Petersburg, Russia
at the time. But even with complete access to cultural context and the full text of the book, one
can still find myriad unspecified features.
But how can I know that the difference between my Raskolnikov and your Raskolnikov
is trivial? Generally speaking, among elliptical features of the world established in Crime and
Punishment, there are two types: the trivial and the non-trivial. The non-trivial elliptical features
of an established fictional world are those features that we have hitherto described as
indeterminate. For example, in Tatyana Tolstaya‟s novel The Slynx, the Slynx is a mythical
creature, but the question is never answered whether the proposition „the Slynx exists‟ is true
within the fictional world established in the text. So the existence of the Slynx is a non-trivial
elliptical feature of the fictional world established by Tolstaya. An elliptical feature is trivial if its
hypothetical determination contributes no useful literary criticism of the work. Thus, the number
of hairs on Sherlock Holmes‟ head is a trivial elliptical feature of the fictional world established
by Conan Doyle.
While literary criticism is bound to attempt to fill in the non-trivial gaps in the fictional
world (an act which most readers engage in on their own), filling in some of the trivial gaps
becomes a subjective practice that most of us find necessary when we attempt to imaginatively
construct the fictional world of the text. Hence, the bifurcation we mentioned earlier, Everett‟s
“dual nature” of fictional characters, is a consequence of the fact that in order to imagine the
fictional world depicted by any given work of fiction, we must imaginatively determine certain
indeterminate features of the fictional world – for in order to pretend that the fictional world is
the real world, this fictional world must be taken to be – at least in principle – just as determinate
as the real world.
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But must we imagine Raskolnikov to have a face? Probably not, for we certainly do not
imaginatively determine within our pretense every single feature which is in-principle
determinable. So then why do we speak as if fictional worlds are complete? The answer to this
question is much simpler than one would think: as mentioned in Section 3.1, the act of makebelieve is a game, and while everyone who plays the game is aware that it is a game, anyone who
says that it is only a game has broken the cardinal rule of the game. Within the game, we pretend
that we are in the fictional world we are imagining and in so doing we also pretend that the
fictional world is complete. This pretense of completeness is maintained by imaginatively
fleshing out any feature of the fictional world which is left underdetermined by the author that
would otherwise threaten to break this first rule of the pretense, viz. that it is always uncouth to
say what all collaborators should already know: “It‟s just a game.” Consequently, we need not
imagine every detail of a fictional world in order to treat it as complete. We need only imagine
those details which we find necessary for participation in the game.
While this mentalist Waltonian stance is capable of explaining the intuition that fictional
worlds are complete, it is not capable of explaining the other side of the bifurcation: the author‟s
prescription to us to imagine certain things and our critical restriction to speak only of these
certain things. In Section 3.2 we determined that the prop of a work of fiction, the real-world
object or event which fixes the ways in which we apply the principles of generation for our
pretense, is an impression of the actual world. What allows Timmy and Tommy to collaborate in
a game of make-believe was the fact that there were tree stumps to which both boys have access.
When a Petersburg-born Russian reads Crime and Punishment, she will certainly have a much
different impression of Petersburg upon which to build her pretense than I will. Though she
might say that the difference between her impression and mine is trivial where Crime and
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Punishment is concerned, it seems as if Dostoevsky must have assumed that there is some
similarity between my impression of the actual world and his impression of the actual world,
despite the fact that no one has access to anyone else‟s impressions. So if ficta and fictional
worlds are entirely mental, then when I speak about Holmes, when you speak about Holmes and
when Conan Doyle speaks about Holmes, all three of us refer to different objects, and these
objects are private to each of us. Though Walton proposes that props prescribe, there is still no
mechanism which can explain how it is that the principles of generation for Crime and
Punishment do not produce a unique and incommensurate pretense for each person. We conclude
that this naïve form of mentalism is still not enough to secure either an adequate theory of
pretense or an adequate theory of fiction.
4.2 Collingwood’s Theory of Art
The contemporary philosopher is in the comfortable position of having an enormous
library of previous theories from which to borrow in times of either need or laziness. This
contemporary philosopher has found R. G. Collingwood‟s theory of art, established in The
Principles of Art,24 to be adequate to the task of addressing both sides of the Bifurcation, which
our naïve mentalism could not do. In accomplishing this task, we will first lay out Collingwood‟s
theory of art – a complicated theory of sensation, imagination, expression and language; then, in
the following section, this theory will be applied to our specific case of canonical works of
fiction.
Collingwood‟s theory of art maintains that all artworks are expressions of emotions felt
by the artist (author). Among these emotions, the simple and raw ones are the psychical
emotions; whereas, the more complex ones are conscious and intellection emotions. What is
24

R. G. Collingwood, The Principles of Art, (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1938).
Hereafter cited in text as Principles.
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peculiar about Collingwood‟s theory is that emotions are characterized so broadly that any act of
language is an expression of emotion. In fact, the identification of expression with language will
be crucial to this sophisticated form of mentalism, for it will solve the problem of externality to
which naïve mentalism fell prey. Another crucial feature of this mentalism is that it explains how
the impression of the actual world can be used as a prop for a fictional world: on Collingwood‟s
theory, there is no qualitative distinction between memory and imagination. The only difference
is that one is constrained to construction based on sensa and the other is not so constrained. Let
us therefore begin with sensation.
4.2.1 Sensations and Emotions : The Constituents of Human Experience
According to Collingwood, human sensory experience takes the form of a union of sensedata with an emotional charge (conceived analogously to the primary features of a sub-atomic
particle: mass and electric charge). The various color tactics that advertising companies
implement nowadays are evidence that even on the simplest sensory level, a sense-datum (or
sensum, as Collingwood calls them), as experienced, is primordially inextricable from its
“emotional charge”. Collingwood recognizes that many persons nowadays have „sterilized‟ their
sensory experience in an effort to tune out the emotional charge:
In persons who are likely to read [The Principles of Art],the habit of sterilizing sense has probably
become so ingrained that a reader who tries to go behind it will find it very hard to overcome the
resistance which hampers him at every move in his inquiry. In so far as he succeeds in recognizing
what really happens in himself, I believe he will find that every sensum presents itself to him
bearing a particular emotional charge, and that sensation and emotion, thus related, are twin
elements in every experience of feeling. In children this is clearer than in adults, because they have
not yet been educated into the conventions of the society into which they have been born; in artists
clearer than in other adults, because in order to be artists they must train themselves in that
particular to resist these conventions (Principles 163).

The most basic forms of emotions are the passive emotions, which are later either perpetuated or
denied by the consciousness which experiences them. On Collingwood's theory of art, it is the
task of imagination to examine and explore these sensations and emotions by holding onto them
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for longer than the passive experiential phenomenon which initially brought about the sensations
and emotions would normally allow. Thus, there is something active and free at work in the act
of imagination (Principles 197).25 This freedom lies in the concept of attention: when our
conscious mind attends to a feature of experience (whether sensory or emotive), it chooses to
preserve that feature for longer than the short period of time provided to us by our passive
sensory and emotive experiences – it divides all these experiences into (a) the unattended: those
which vanish after the duration of our experience of them lapses; and (b) the attended: those
which remain when the experience is finished (Principles 203-6). Any act of recollection is an
example of this phenomenon, for the concept of memory is intricately bound to the concept of
imagination. The more intensely we attend to an experience, the greater the clarity of that
experience. Peripheral vision is a readily available example of this fact.
As part of the extension of experience simpliciter, imagination does not provide us with
anything universal. All of our imagined sensations and emotions are singular, particular and
experienced only once – and this Collingwood takes to be an obvious feature of human
experience. In a trivial sense, the racecar that you imagine cannot possibly be identical to the
racecar that I imagine because you and I are different persons. The dissimilarity begins with nonidentity, but it goes beyond the mere fact that you and I are not identical. Because of this nonidentity, the only means by which you and I can even compare our sensations and emotions is by
somehow expressing them to each other and deciding each for ourselves, based on this
expression, how similar your sensations and emotions are to mine. Thus, only if I tell you that
my racecar is a white and red formula 1, you will be able to determine whether there is some

25

I interpret Collingwood to use the word „freedom‟ somewhat phenomenally and thus independently of
metaphysical implications. If simply refers to the experience of choice, regardless of the debate between libertarians
and determinists, then we may take Collingwood to be accounting for the experience of activity versus the
experience of passivity. And the concept of freedom accounts for this distinction.
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similarity between our imaginings – at least concerning the criteria of color and shape. Despite
these similarities, there are many possible dissimilarities between our imaginings which have not
even been spoken. It is these unspoken yet highly likely dissimilarities which secure the nonuniversality of emotions, and part of an author‟s charge is to expose some of these differences by
generating contention and disagreement about meaning via explicitly non-abstracted (and
therefore non-universalized) expression. “The poet…, in proportion as he understands his
business, gets as far away as possible from merely labeling his emotions as instances of this or
that general kind, and takes enormous pains to individualize them by expressing them in terms
which reveal their difference from any other emotion of the same sort” (Principles 113). The
poet does not express his emotions such that the audience will feel the same emotion, for this is
impossible; rather, he expresses his emotions such that each member of the audience will express
to herself an emotion similar to the one the author felt.
4.2.2 Conscious Emotions: Expression of Emotion or Expression as Emotion?
One of the essential features of art is the expression of emotions. But what does
„expression‟ mean? Collingwood goes to great pains to make sure that the reader does not
interpret expression as arousal – the first of three parts of The Principles of Art is dedicated to
this precaution. An activity which arouses human emotions, he observes, assumes a purpose for
the arousal: it is a means-ends activity. The purpose for arousal is what separates different forms
of emotional arousal from each other. Commercials arouse emotions whose purpose is to effect
an action concerning their products just as politicians arouse emotions whose purpose is to effect
an action concerning votes. If the purported artist arouses emotions for their own sake, she has
produced entertainment; if she arouses them to bring the observer to activity (as in oratory
rabble-rousing), then she has produced what Collingwood calls „magic‟. On Collingwood‟s
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theory, these are all crafts – not arts – because they assume that the activity of art is a functional
means-ends activity.26
Before we further examine what it means to express an emotion or sensation, we must
determine what it is that emotions and sensations are. Collingwood‟s ontology of emotions and
sensations is determined by the psychical layers of the agent experiencing the emotions and
sensations.27 The first set of passive experiential phenomena is sensory experience, which
Collingwood calls „sensa‟ as distinguished from the activity-connoting form „sensation‟. This
level is nothing more than the sense-data about which Russell spoke when he described his desk.
Pure sensation requires absolutely no cognitive activity: it can be argued that even computers
have this capacity.
The presence of a psyche, however, leaves emotive impressions upon the agent. Bulls
charge with rage at red cloth and cats react with fear at certain shapes. This is what Collingwood
calls emotional charge – the second set of passive experiential phenomena. Whether or not this
emotional charge is imposed upon the sensa by the psyche (emotive realism) or is detected in the
sensa by the psyche (emotive anti-realism) is irrelevant, because the phenomenon of emotional
charge is both passive and private: neither can this question be answered, nor does answering it
have any effect on Collingwood‟s system. Let us just say that these psychical emotions are
concurrent with sensations and exclusive to agents who possess psyches.
Sense-data and psychical emotions exhaust the experiential limits of a pre-conscious
agent, yet these two sets of experiential phenomena (sense-data and psychical emotions)
26

Collingwood denies that art is a means-ends activity, but he does not explicitly state what other sorts of activities
there are. But if we ask the question “what is the purpose of art?” then we have already assumed that it is a meansends activity. In positing the existence of human activities which do not have a means-ends structure, he is implicitly
concurring with Wittgenstein on the matter: This is simply what we do. Collingwood is, of course, careful not point
out that although art is not essentially a means-ends activity, it can still serve this function secondarily.
27
Collingwood does not define the word „psyche‟, though there are myriad available examples of animals whose
cognitive activity is limited to what Collingwood calls psychical emotions (aggression, fear, pleasure, lust, etc.).
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comprise, in one sense, the totality of the passive content of human experience. In fact, these two
sets of passive phenomena are already enough for the existence of simple languages, such as
animal communication. And so for Collingwood, animal communication is the expression of
psychical emotions via behavioral signs which are common to the animals doing the
communicating.28 Cats wink at and meow at each other because these are their natural modes of
expression, where to express an emotion is to behave a certain way upon the experience of an
emotion. The natural mode of expression for any creature is nothing more than the set of actions
that accompany the experience of the emotion and/or sensation. For Collingwood,
communication comes about by the simple fact that beings with psyches react to stimuli and
recognize similar reactions in others: two animals of the same species may communicate because
they naturally express emotions in the same way. This is the genesis of expression, which, for
Collingwood, is the original form of language. For cats, a hiss expresses aggression, a wink
expresses non-aggression, a purr pleasure, a growl displeasure, etc. These unconscious
expressions can be thought of as instinctive rituals accompanying the emotions they express, for
an unconscious animal cannot but express emotions it expresses in the ways that it does.
“But,” an attentive reader might complain, “human experience is much richer than the
mere psychical emotions: we love, we despair, we ire, we hate.” Collingwood is more than
sympathetic with such a reader; for the psychical emotions, thus far described, are not the subject
of art. Pure psychical emotions like aggression and fear are too raw and animal for their
expression to be termed „art‟, for art is delicate and subtle rather than brutish and coarse. The
emotions expressed in art require effort to express, and they take time to understand (re-express).
Although expressions of fear and aggression are often component parts of an artwork, these
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Wittgenstein expressed this fact when he said that animals and human beings share a “form of life”.
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emotions (as well as their expressions) are not sufficiently organized to constitute the expression
of an artwork. For art, as a distinctively human enterprise, must be a conscious act.
The emotions our attentive reader has mentioned, on the other hand, are complex enough
to be the subject of art, for these emotions are conscious emotions. Intuitively, there is a respect
in which conscious emotions are passive, for sometimes one cannot help but feel angry or in
despair. But there is also a respect in which they are active, as any adult should know by now:
anger, for example, is an emotion that must often be neutralized for the sake of civility.
A conscious agent bears the capacity for attention which, as mentioned above, preserves
a passive experience and converts it into an active experience: attention lies at the heart of
imagination. A conscious agent who also uses language to express – via that agent‟s natural
mode of communication (e.g. voice, pictorial design, body language, etc.) – the sensa and
psychical emotions she experiences is now in what Collingwood calls a “double situation”.
By definition, a conscious agent is aware of itself, as is implied by the freedom of choice
in the act of attention. And self-awareness entails that any act of language from one conscious
being to another is an act of expression both to itself and to that other. E. g. the same phrase in
the mind often means something different once it receives the subtle nuances of both vocal and
body language, and this is why persons who are surprised at the audience‟s reception of a
thought freshly spoken often find themselves in embarrassment. Provided that there is such a
difference, every act of speech is an act of expression: it is just as new to the speaker as to the
listener. The expression expresses to the speaker and to the listener at the same time; it does not
merely repeat.
So the double situation is the fact that any language user is always both a speaker and a
listener, regardless of whose vocal cords are vibrating. The act of speaking is essentially the
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expression of an emotion to another conscious agent, so if one is alone in the room, one must be
expressing to oneself. It is for this reason that the act of understanding is the act of expressing.
When I understand a poem, I feel the emotions that it expresses, but the means by which I feel
those emotions is to express them to myself using the words of the poem. Thus, all persons who
experience an artistic expression are collaborators in that expression, because they all express
emotions, though they do borrow a medium of expression. On Collingwood‟s account, then, the
work of art, which is the simultaneous act of expression and feeling or, as Collingwood terms it,
a “total imaginative experience,” is not essentially connected to the physical bodies which we
typically refer to when we speak the word “art”; rather, the artifacts produced by artists are
merely tools used in the creation of art proper – which the artist intends to exist in the mind of
the observer. Yet there are many objects not fashioned by an artist which still prove to be
occasions for the existence of art in the mind of an observer. The artist‟s goal is not only to
produce art in the mind of an observer, but to do it immediately and frequently. But while
Collingwood himself is a mentalist about art, it seems to me that often we cannot experience art
with clarity unless the physical body is present. This fact is most apparent in imaginary
sensations: the fine details of Michaelangelo‟s David are much easier to imagine when the
sculpture is in front of you than at any other time.
This double situation provides conscious language users with a new capacity: the
relationality which is defining of our self-awareness has afforded us the ability to organize and
modify the various emotions which we express. For after we express to ourselves an emotion (or
after some other person does so), first we recall both the emotion and the expression
imaginatively, then we decide whether the one has adequately expressed the other, and finally we
adjust the expression accordingly. Whenever we correct another person‟s expression, we apply
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our conscious organization upon her expression. This is how we recognize emotions in others,
for Collingwood: by re-expressing their emotions to ourselves. Consequently, on Collingwood‟s
phenomenology of emotions, the artist both experiences conscious emotions and expresses them
at the same time. So the act of expressing an emotion is not only the act of clarifying and
distinguishing it from other emotions, but it is also constitutive of that emotion:
[T]he expression of emotion is not, as it were, a dress made to fit an emotion already existing, but
is an activity without which the experience of that emotion cannot exist. Take away the language,
and you take away what is expressed; there is nothing left but crude feeling at the merely
psychical level (Principles 244).

In fact, because every emotion is different and because we cannot recognize a conscious emotion
until it is organized, no conscious emotion is felt unless it is expressed.
The emotions expressed by an artist through a work of art are not always expressed by
the artist alone, for there are often collaborators: actors, dancers, and violinists to name a few.
But Collingwood does not end artistic collaboration with these traditional collaborators. Rather,
the entire audience, for Collingwood, collaborates in the artwork. This is because each person in
the audience finds herself in the double situation which demands simultaneous expression and
experiencing. Thus, members of the audience express the content of a Macbeth to themselves
using the materials provided by Shakespeare and the actors, thereby becoming themselves
collaborators in the artwork that is Macbeth. This is why no play is performed without an
audience: otherwise it is only practiced.29
So let us consider an obvious example of such a conscious emotion: love. In one sense
love is composed of a combination of psychical emotions (which are likely to include pleasure,
aggression, non-aggression, fear, lust or eros, and more). But, due to the double situation of the
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While the actors themselves count as spectators and collaborators, they do not count as an audience because their
act of expression is memorized and rehearsed. They do not have the fresh, almost naïve eyes of an audience. This is
the crucial contribution of an audience.
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conscious agent, in another sense it is composed of a structure consciously imposed by the agent
to organize the psychical emotions into a coherent human emotion. It is unlikely that I
understand what it means to love my wife if I express aggression, pleasure or lust toward her in a
disorganized fashion. In fact, it is more likely that I will be considered either insane or
emotionally immature.
Poets have expressed to us many times in their poems the mysteries and nuances of love,
jealousy, courage and other conscious emotions, and often the reader learns something new
about these emotions from each poem. Because that which is complex must be built out of that
which is simple, the raw and crude psychical emotions are an obvious choice for the building
blocks of conscious emotions. For this reason, Collingwood likens the psychical emotions to the
concept of Aristotelian matter: they are the stuff out of which all other emotions are fashioned.
Similarly, conscious emotions are likened to the concept of Aristotelian form: they are the
organization and structure of psychical emotions. Therefore, the differences in form and
distribution of psychical emotions within a conscious emotion are what distinguish each
conscious emotion from the others.
4.2.3 Intellectual Experience: The Formalization of an Expressive Language
The final set of experiential phenomena is the intellectual emotions. These emotions may
only be felt and expressed once the type of language discussed until this point – conscious
expressive language – is fitted and formalized by means of grammar and logic, that it may serve
the organizational needs of the intellect. But because no two emotions are alike, grammar and
logic cannot be used to express everything that there is to say – some emotions just won‟t fit the
mold. Collingwood expresses the violence done to language by grammar in his depiction of
grammarians as butchers (Principles 259). Grammarians assume that expressive categories are
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distinct (Principles 254-9), just as logicians assume that thought must be expressed according to
certain forms. Imprecise though they may at times be, the goal of introducing grammar and logic
is to “make language into a perfect vehicle for the expression of thought” (Principles 259), and
we have clearly had much success.
The intellectual emotions expressed through formalized language arise out of situations
“which could not generate them unless [they] were intellectually apprehended.” This should not
suggest that intellectual emotions are expressed only in formalized language. Rather,
formalization permits expression of these emotions, and this expression often occurs in tandem
with conscious emotions:
[T]he poet converts human experience into poetry not by expurgating it, cutting out the intellectual
elements and preserving the emotional, and then expressing this residue; but by fusing thought
itself into emotion: thinking in a certain way and then expressing how it feels to think in that way.
Thus Dante has fused the Thomistic philosophy into a poem expressing what it feels like to be a
Thomist. Shelley, when he made the earth say, „I spin beneath my pyramid of night‟, expressed
what it feels like to be a Copernican (Principles 295).

We now have all the materials with which to formulate a Collingwoodian definition of
art. Art is an activity: it is the simultaneous collaborative expression and experiencing of a
complex sensory and emotive imagining with unique imaginings contributed by each member of
the collaborating community.
4.3 Applying Collingwood’s Theory
Now that we have laid out the relevant features of Collingwood‟s theory of art, we may
equip it with the vocabulary we have already established prior to laying out Collingwood‟s
theory. This translation is generally a smooth translation, for Collingwood‟s theory is a very
suitable match for our own theory.
What is, for Collingwood, a total imaginative experience is, for Walton, an act of
pretense or make-believe. When we say that for Collingwood, ficta are mentalia, we mean that
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they consist of an active imaginative rendering whose matter is the raw and passively
experienced mentalia – emotions and sensations – and whose form is the conscious and
intellectual organization of these mentalia into a coherent imaginative whole. A pretense is a
complex web of emotions, and because emotions are thoughts for Collingwood, a pretense is also
a complex web of thoughts. But because no set of emotions and sensations is the same for any
given person, there are as many fictional worlds for any given text as there are readers. If an
expression is a purely imaginative act (and therefore private), then the expression and the
emotion are not distinct from each other. Both expression and emotion are private to the
individual expression and emoting, and, as such, they are indistinguishable from each other.
If, on the other hand, the expression is imposed onto an artifact, such as ink on bound
paper, then the expression is distinct from the emotion in the following way: there is only one
expression, but there many are associated emotions – specifically, one for each reader. This is
participation in the creation of a fictional world, because each reader uses the author‟s words to
express the fictional world to herself. It is to the extent that the reader is expected to participate
in the creation of the fictional world that the reader is a collaborator in the act of art that
produces the fictional world. This entails that whenever we refer to „the‟ fictional world of a text,
we are actually referring to a very large set of fictional worlds. As David Lewis proposed, there
are myriad fictional worlds to which the stories about Sherlock Holmes refers, but the Lewisian
claim that the set is infinite (or near infinite) because variations on the worlds are infinite (or
near infinite) is a distinctly realist claim. A Collingwoodian mentalist ought to maintain that the
stories written by Conan Doyle refer to as many Holmes worlds as there are collaborators in the
act of imagining the world of Sherlock Holmes (and perhaps more, since some collaborators may
imagine multiple worlds).
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A distinction should be made between the infinite set of Holmes worlds which may be
imagined and the finite set of Holmes worlds which are imagined. Strictly speaking, the
Collingwoodian mentalist must maintain that the only Holmes worlds which exist are the worlds
which have been imagined by real persons – all others are merely hypothetical Holmes worlds
which do not exist in any way until they are imagined.30 So how do these hypothetical Holmes
worlds come to exist? They come to exist only when a person consciously attends to them. I
alone can create as many Sherlock Holmes worlds as I like, though it is unlikely that I will spend
the time necessary for the imaginative construction of these worlds. Based on these
considerations, we can say that while the text of Crime and Punishment is an elaborate
expression of the events of an imaginary world, the specific sentences written by Dostoevsky in
the book itself are expressions of only the features of this imaginary world to which Dostoevsky
wanted to draw our attention. Everything else he has left up to us to attend to (if we choose).
For Collingwood, intellectual language is an attempt to structure and formalize a smooth
and organic layering of the expressions of a rich manifold of emotions and sensations. Because
this task is impossible to complete in written language (or any language, for that matter),
vagueness is unavoidable. Obviously, this is impossible because a dense world would require
infinite expression in order for us to achieve the sort of objective descriptive precision which is
possible in the actual world. But there is another reason that a complete formal transformation of
written language is impossible. Written language lacks the capacity to express many of the
sensations and emotions which are part of our experience of the actual world; however, written
language can be used in tandem with other modes of expression in order to capture a broader
30

Minimally, these hypothetical fictional worlds do already exist as a vague set of pretenses by virtue of the fact
that I am imagining them right now. Each of these worlds, however, is virtually free of content. An alternate
treatment of this phenomenon is that I am pretending to imagine an infinite set of Holmes worlds. The act of
imagination is itself only a pretense because I‟m not really imagining anything having to do with Sherlock Holmes;
rather, I am only speaking as if I am.
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spectrum of emotions. In Collingwood‟s colorful parlance,
if a civilization loses all power of expression except through voice, and then asserts that the voice
is the best expressive medium, it is simply saying that it knows of nothing in itself that is worth
expressing except what can be thus expressed; and that is tautology, for it merely means „what we
… do not know we do not know‟, except so far as it suggests the addition: „and we do not wish to
find out‟ (Principles 246).

According to Collingwood‟s theory of art, all emotions are only experienced insofar as they are
expressed, so if an emotion cannot be expressed in written language, then it will not be expressed
unless an alternate medium of expression is used. Therefore, all texts are constrained by the
emotional and sensory carrying capacity of the language in which they are written. And formal
language has a smaller carrying capacity than a combination of formal and non-formal language.
If we accept Sorensen‟s suggestion to treat fiction sorites paradoxes as a consequence of
semantic vagueness concerning an object (ficta) which is not vague, then the Collingwoodian
notion that there is no qualitative distinction between our conscious experience of the actual
world (about which standard sorites paradoxes are concerned) and our experience with fictional
worlds (about which fiction sorites paradoxes are concerned) neatly fits our treatment of the
fiction sorites paradoxes. For Walton, pretense is partially constitutive of the world in which we
live, because the practice is simply inescapable even in everyday human affairs;31 for
Collingwood, our experiences of both kinds of worlds are located in the imagination:
imagination is completely constitutive of both, though Collingwood would not describe
memories as pretenses.32 The similarity between the word „noonish‟ and the name „Sherlock
Holmes‟ is that both words explicitly denote imprecision. The difference, however, is that the
31

Walton holds this to be true by virtue of the depth and ubiquity of pretense-dependent art. However, there are
other, more mundane examples of pretenses at work in a normal adult life. Currency, for example, is an act of makebelieve: we pretend fiat paper money has trading value because everyone else also participates in the same pretense.
The practice of „workplace professionalism‟ is also an act of make-believe: we pretend that we do not have any
personal involvement with the persons with whom we interact in the workplace. And so on.
32
For Collingwood, the imaginative process which creates memories about sensa is constrained by the actual
experience of sensa; whereas, the imaginative process which creates pretenses is only constrained by the pretensegoverning rules which the agent has self-imposed.

72

one is caused by a strictly numerical imprecision, while the other is caused by a much broader
imprecision – an imaginary imprecision, out of which numerical imprecisions galore can be
gleaned and used to construct fiction sorites arguments. This imaginary imprecision is a feature
of the character of Sherlock Holmes because no expression can possibly determine Sherlock
Holmes as a dense, completed person – imaginary augmentation is necessary to complete any
feature of Sherlock Holmes to which we attend and in which we want to find dense
determination. In short, there is nothing about my imaginary Holmes which prevents me from
giving him all the properties he needs to be as fully and densely determined as an actual person.
What prevents me from doing so is that such a task could never be completed. So we see that
semantic vagueness is surely the culprit in both cases: in the standard case, „noonish‟ is an
imprecise term which can be precisified in any specific usage (15 minutes after noon may or may
not be noonish, depending on the size of one‟s time cushion); similarly in the fiction case,
„Sherlock Holmes‟ is an imprecise term which can be precisified in any specific usage (my
Sherlock Holmes has 154,511 hairs). These clarifications should abate Sorensen‟s objection that
anti-realist explanations of the sorites paradox tend to be ad hoc.
The Bifurcation in our speech seems less severe now because the reference of „Sherlock
Holmes‟ in any sentence about him is not completely determinate; it is only spoken of as if it
were determinate, because any heretofore unspecified feature of Holmes that you care to
consider is capable of being determined by your own imagination. But the bifurcation it is still
present and still relevant, because the within/without distinction is still essential to the business
of fiction. To speak of a fictional world from without is, for the most part at least, to assume
ignorance of the experiences of imaginative collaborators – for these are private. But let us not
forget that all emotions and sensations are private. It is not the privacy of the emotions that
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causes literary criticism to ignore the experiences of audience collaborators. It is the privacy of
the contribution of the audience collaborators which prevents literary criticism from considering
any expressions but those written by the original author. Interpretations and variations of theatre,
for example, are many, so critics must keep in mind what remains the same when comparing
such variations. Literary criticism, then, focuses on the expressions of the author in an attempt to
further clarify the structure of the emotions and sensations evoked by these expressions. So while
literary criticism does ignore the experiences of collaborators, it is also an act of artistic
collaboration, which is why poetry is often read in tandem with criticism. In effect, the literary
critic is attempting to collaborate in a pretense whose principles of generation cannot change, for
a text does not change. Introduction of no new principles means that anyone who intends to
collaborate in such a pretense must explicitly demarcate a boundary between imaginings which
explicitly or implicitly adhere to the principles given to us by the author and the imaginings
which either break or are not covered by the principles given to us by the author. Sherlock
Holmes may have 154,511 hairs on his head, but Conan Doyle did not imply this number
anywhere in his stories, so if I believe it, it is not according to any principle of generation that I
do so. Consequently, I cannot expect anyone else to accept that this is the number of hairs on his
head. This takes care of the critical (disengaged) side of the Bifurcation.
Collingwood‟s account of sensation is relevant to our project because of the similarity
between memory and objects of imagination. While sensa come about through involuntary
means, those sensations which we commit to memory are in part a voluntary set: that set of
sensations to which we attend. For Collingwood, there is no qualitative difference between
memory and imagination. The only difference is quantitative: depth and degree of precision.
Because the only constitutive difference between memory and constructive (i.e. fictional)
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imagination is of a quantitative nature, the truth-makers for fictional sentences are equally
similar to the truth-makers for non-fictional sentences. When I say „Sherlock Holmes plays the
violin‟ and „Barack Obama plays basketball‟, each of these sentences is only spoken as true by
virtue of the fact that they are true in their respective imaginative worlds. Of course, the
difference between these sentences is that one may be checked against the physical world and the
other may not. But it is not the act of playing basketball which is “out there” in the actual world
which makes the sentence „Barack Obama plays basketball‟ spoken by me as true. If the fact,
independent of human thought, that Obama plays basketball is what distinguishes a sentence
spoke as true from a sentence spoken as false, then no one could possibly speak the sentence as
false. The reason that we all agree that Barack Obama plays basketball is not that the sentence is
true independent of human cognition. This may be, but, as Kant often reminds us, we have no
access to such a fact. We have only access to our experience of the physical world, and the
partial passivity of this experience is what secures agreement concerning Obama‟s basketball
habits. This sentence is not widely thought to be true by virtue of mere coincidence – we don‟t
all just incidentally imagine the same reality. Rather, reality, as experienced, involves acceptance
of the proposition that Obama plays basketball. We have, here, a distinction between a sentence
spoken as true by the speaker, and a sentence which is true independent of the speaker. The first
is relevant to a fictional mentalism, and the second is not. The similarity between the truthmakers of fictional and non-fictional sentences is the means by which Collingwood can account
for the fact that we apparently speak fictional sentences as if they were spoken about the actual
world. The similarity extends beyond mere seeming, for our accounts of the actual world
originate in an act of imagination just as our accounts of imaginary worlds do. And this takes
care of the fictional (engaged) side of the Bifurcation.
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It should be stressed that Collingwood was an aesthetic idealist, maintaining that
“aesthetic experience … is wholly and entirely imaginative” (Principles 306). But this
experience does not arise out of thin air, for emotions require expression in order to be felt. As
mentioned previously, the purpose of the physical work is to facilitate the observer‟s own
imaginative expression. In most cases, a physical work is a necessary condition for the existence
of art: a story must to written or told, an image shown, a song played, etc. But despite the
frequent dependence of an artist upon her artifact, Collingwood believes that art is not essentially
physical, a fact evident in our ability to keep a tune in mind all day after having heard it only
once. In the case of traditional works of fiction, the text or the telling of the story is a necessary
condition for the existence of the art. The physical work is a necessary condition for the author‟s
ability to provide others with the expression of his fictional world, but the fictional world may
still be experienced without access to the text. In fact, we can imagine simple fictions to
ourselves without any physical activity at all, thus demonstrating that the physical text is not
essential to the work of fiction.
Yet there is still something artificial about the Collingwoodian explanation of the
bifurcation in our speech about fictional worlds. Except in the special case in which a person
imaginatively expresses to himself, the physical body is absolutely necessary to all acts of
expression. Assuming that the artist intended to share her expression, how could we recognize an
expression if there were no physical sign? This should suggest to us that art not is purely mental,
as Collingwood thought. Emotions are purely mental,33 but any expression which ventures
beyond the mind of the person expressing is purely physical. When I speak, my words are
33

An emotion – as felt – is an experience, and is thus purely mental. Naturally, there are many physical processes
that accompany the experience of an emotion (blushes, hormonal releases, laughter, neuron firing, etc.), but these
are all physical processes distinct (though associated with) the mental experience. Whether mental experience can be
reduced to physical events is not relevant to our project; we simply take the distinction between the two kinds of
events (mental and physical) to be obvious, even if an explanation for the distinction is not.
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vibrations in the air, and when I draw, my pictures are marks on a paper. If I do not speak, then
no one hears my words and my emotion is left (communally) unexpressed. Though Collingwood
seems to believe that physical expression is not necessary to the creation of art (and spectators
are, therefore, merely eavesdroppers), the genesis of communication as Collingwood describes it
seems to be in tension with such a firmly mentalist position. For animals, an expression is a
physical manifestation of the emotion imaginatively experienced, and this manifestation cannot
be helped:
[The most primitive kind of expression, psychical expression] consists in the doing of involuntary
and perhaps wholly unconscious bodily acts, related in a peculiar way to the emotions they are
said to express. Thus, certain distortions of the face express pain; a slackening of muscles and a
cold pallor of the skin express fear; and so forth (Principles 229).
Every kind and shade of emotion which occurs at the purely psychical level of experience has its
counterpart in some change of muscular or circulatory or glandular system which … expresses it
(Principles 230).

But it is only the psychical expressions and emotions which are involuntary. Conscious emotions
are felt voluntarily, for they must be organized before they are felt. This means that their
expression is also voluntary, and Collingwood‟s position that art is completely mental remains
(momentarily) intact.
We still seem to have the problem that naïve mentalism had: given that art is a
completely mental affair, there is no security in Dostoevsky‟s assumption that the fiction I
imagine when I read Crime and Punishment will be similar enough to the fiction that he
imagines that we can speak of them loosely as the same fiction. Collingwood himself believed
that the artist‟s act of expression was only incidentally expressed in physical terms and that, in
principle, the expression may already be completed in the mind of the artist. But this is not
always how art is created. Often an artist will start a project, let it sit for a moment and come
back to it with fresh eyes. The act of expression, in such an instance, occurs in response to that
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which is already partially expressed. In this sense, we may say that there is a necessary
externalization involved in producing art.
In contradistinction to Collingwood‟s belief that an expression might be private, it will be
useful for us to recall one of his contemporaries: Ludwig Wittgenstein. For Collingwood,
expression is language, this identity allows us to apply Wittgenstein‟s Private Language
Argument to any act of expression.34 To put this argument loosely in Collingwood‟s terms: there
is no emotion that cannot be expressed somehow, and because we are all capable of experiencing
these emotions, we are all capable of understanding their expressions when we see them.
Therefore, there is no expression which is in principle private; there are only expressions which
remain private by virtue of having never been spoken. But even in this last case, the chances are
that some artist will eventually experience an emotion similar enough that his expression renders
the unspoken expression obsolete. We conclude that Dostoevsky‟s assumption that I will
imagine a pretense similar enough to the one he imagined to describe them both as the fictional
world of Crime and Punishment is safe. And the safety of this assumption extends beyond the
fact that there is no in principle private language. The safety of this assumption comes from that
fact that human beings use language to express their impressions of the actual world on a regular
basis. Dostoevsky knew what knowledge he could assume his readers had because he spoke to
people about their impressions of the actual world on a regular basis.
It may be useful to think of the text of a work of fiction as analogous to the foundation of
a building. The foundation is often composed of an entirely different material from the rest of the
building, and it is poured as a single solid whole; whereas the building itself is constructed
progressively and in parts. In our case, the text of Crime and Punishment is the foundation of the
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Philosophical Investigations, tr. G. E. M Anscombe, 3rd ed., (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2001), ~ §256-§271.
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work of art. It comes as a single unit, for we cannot add or remove anything from a completed
work of art without turning it into a different work of art. This solid edifice gives us a foothold
for constructing an imaginary world in which Raskolnikov, Svidrigailov, Porfiry Petrovich,
Sofia, and the rest come alive. But, to break our building analogy, the fiction is never completed.
It always bears the potential of completion, because most texts are sufficiently robust that a
completed fictional world may be imagined (if a powerful enough mind cared to do so), but it
never will be. Rather, we attend to the parts of the world which interest us, and we build these
parts up in order to express to ourselves the various emotions that are latent in the fictional
worlds for which Dostoevsky poured the foundation.
The Bifurcation in our speech about fiction, then, is better explained as a distinction
between the physical part of the work of fiction and the mental part: the body and the reasoned
activity. Collingwood is correct that the mental aspect of art is what is really critical to the
human mind – for this is the activity of art. Whatever physical activity an artwork might have,
such as the moving light of a film or the actors in a play, this kind of activity is not considered to
be essential to art – otherwise aerobics would be art. Art, being a human institution, is both a
body and an activity; nevertheless, as in all human institutions, the body is conformed to the
activity for which it is used. We don‟t care about ink-marks in a set of bound pages per se, and
we don‟t care about paint splattered upon a canvas per se. If we did, all painted and inked objects
would be art. No, what we care about is the expressions manifested in these works.
But let us not make the mistake of suggesting that fictional worlds exist within the text,
for this would be analogous to the claim that thought exists within the body. In fact, thought
exists within the mind – and whether the mind exists within the body is a question for a different
essay. Similarly, we shall say that fictional worlds – which are ultimately imaginative thoughts –
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exist within the mind, but just as human thought does not exist without a body, so collaborative
fictional worlds also do not exist without body (and private fictional worlds do not exist without
a body in principle). The text, however, is more than just a physical body. It is a physical body
with a pattern imprinted upon it: it is an expression. Therefore, it is not the body itself which is
of interest to the fictional ontologist; it is the expression embedded within the body, the pattern
of characters. If we were to take the body as being relevant to the fictional world, then we would
have to account for the fact that there are so many copies of Crime and Punishment existing in so
many different forms. Yet the expression of Crime and Punishment is a unity (neglecting
translations – of which my copy is one): there is only one canonical expression of Crime and
Punishment, and this is the particular set of Russian sentences originally published by
Dostoevsky. Thus, the canonical expression, as a pattern of thought impressed upon matter, is the
only part of a fictional world which is necessarily material. As far as literary criticism is
concerned, all other collaborative fictional expressions and emotions may be (and often are)
completely mental. And yet the very act of literary criticism is collaboration in a pretense, an
expression. So while Collingwood has understated the importance of the physical body, this
understatement is forgivable because the importance of the physical body is easy to overstate.
Given this account of the text, how does Walton‟s concept of a prop fit into the mix? In
one sense, the concept of a prop is not necessary to a work of fiction. Collingwood‟s account of
the imagination is also an account of language. For Collingwood, all language is the expression
of emotion – sometimes psychical, sometimes conscious, and sometimes intellectual. The act of
expression is the physical manifestation which (in principle) necessarily accompanies the act of
experiencing the emotion, and this act of expression functions as an act of communication
because there are others who express their emotions in just the same way as we do. Language
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comes about because we recognize an act of expression as such, and we can use another‟s act of
expression to express similar emotions to ourselves. Consequently, a text need not be
prescriptive, despite Walton‟s belief that it is. Though texts are written to be read, the emotions
expressed in the text would not even be felt by the author if he did not write the text! So even if
the author does not intend the work to prompt an act of make-believe, it will still do so for any
reader who is capable of experiencing the emotions expressed therein (provided that the author‟s
expression is complete and coherent).
In another sense, however, the prop is the sensory input which is retained by committing
images to the memory via attention. Because memory-imagination exists prior to constructiveimagination, it is clearly the memory-imagination which provides the raw materials out of which
constructive-imagination can build (just as Locke thought). Although in theatre, props are
physical objects and events which are experienced, the actual existence of these props is not
necessary to the function of a prop. What is necessary to the function of a prop is that physical
objects and events are experienced at some previous time. A play certainly couldn‟t take place
without props, but the presence of props is not essential to every art form. In the case of fiction,
previous familiarity with props is all that is essential: we must have had some experiences and
retained some memories out of which to build a pretense.
Our ontology of pretense, then, is as follows. A pretense is an imaginative experience
and, as such, is a thought, a mental entity. A shared pretense, on the other hand, necessitates
physical expressions – communications between persons who are involved in their own private
pretenses. In communicating these expressions to each other, persons involved in private
pretenses extend the pretense to the public domain. Literary criticism concerning a work of
fiction such as Crime and Punishment is a community of expressions built around the text, which
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holds a special position in the community: it is the master expression to which all other
expressions (within the discourse of Crime and Punishment) must be subjected. The
phenomenon of communication, in a Collingwoodian context, is collaborative mental act whose
effects can be seen in the various expressions by which we communicate.35 Consequently,
despite the involvement of the material world in our pretenses, expressions, acts of make-believe,
and fictional worlds are inter-subjective thoughts constituted by the collective imagined
sensations and emotions of those participating in the pretense. But these collaborative pretenses
have nothing in them which exists over and above the private imaginative experiences of each
collaborator and the expressions shared by the collaborators. A collaborative pretense is an
organized group of private pretenses, just as a conscious emotion is an organized group of
psychical emotions. Therefore, our anti-realist ontology can be summed up: ficta and fictional
worlds are mentalia; private fictional worlds are expressed externally in principle only; and
shared fictional worlds are expressed externally of necessity, but the artifact is only a vehicle for
the expression.
4.4 The Mentalist Interpretation
We now have a plausible resolution to our problem. Let us interpret. First, we observe
that because ficta and fictional worlds are said to exist as mentalia, we no longer need the two
layers of pretenses which Everett and Yablo prescribed to us. There is certainly a pretense
involved in speaking about Sherlock Holmes, but we do not need to adopt a pretense in which
the realist‟s ontology of ficta obtains. Rather, we maintain that a pretense is an act of imagination
which is confined to the human mind, but which can be communicated via expression to other
minds. The benefits of dropping the second layer of pretense are twofold: first, we have
35
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simplified our semantic mechanisms; second, and more importantly, we may now use our
concept of fiction as a basic notion of pretense by which other (non-fictional) discourses may be
reduced to fiction via the two-layer pretense theory. In any case, our interpretation of the
existential class of sentences will be non-literal. „does not exist‟ must be taken to mean „does not
exist independent of human cognition‟.
Because fictional worlds are imaginary, they take the same shape in our minds as the
actual world does. That is, we imagine ourselves experiencing these fictional worlds. So ficta
may be attributed all the same properties as real persons. This means that the only interpretation
that must be done is to note which of the two contexts – the engaged context, in which we are
imagining a private fictional world; or the disengaged context, in which we are collaborating in
an act of imagination which is governed by a master expression, or a public the fictional world –
is the appropriate context for the sentence. Interestingly, this distinction is already present in a
literal interpretation of sentences (F1a), (F1b), (F2a), and (F2b) versus a literal interpretation of
(F2c)! The first four sentences refer to Holmes, Raskolnikov and Porfiry Pretrovich as if they
were persons; whereas, the fifth sentences refers to Raskolnikov as if he is a character.
Consequently, the only interpretation that must be done to accommodate the Bifurcation is to
note which context is intended (if the context is not already evident). We will simply borrow the
fictional fictionalist notation of subscripts: Holmes1 refers to the person, Holmes2 refers to the
character, and Holmes without subscript refers to both.
One of the greatest benefits to adopting Collingwood‟s mentalism is that it entirely
eliminates the dependence upon propositions which was fundamental to Walton‟s conception of
fictional worlds. For Collingwood, fictional worlds are no longer constituted by propositions, but
by acts of imagination: they are constituted by emotions and sensations. This greatly simplifies
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our semantic machinery. No longer do we need to concern ourselves with making sure that all
our propositions are true, which was especially a problem for the fictional class of sentences –
the engaged context. Rather, each sentence expresses an emotion, regardless of whether that
sentence is true or false when spoken in the engaged context.
We also need not distinguish in which fictional world the character exists, because, as a
mental entity, all characters exist in this world though they are all private to each person who
imagines them. The complex semantic acrobatics which are meant to explain how a sentence
about Sherlock Holmes could be true when Sherlock Holmes only exists within a pretense are no
longer necessary because pretenses exist within the mind, so anyone who speaks the sentence
speaks it as true of only himself. Incidentally, we have all chosen to agree that Sherlock Holmes
plays the violin, because we all play the same make-believe game. So the truth-maker of the
sentence „Sherlock Holmes plays the violin‟ is different for every single instance of the sentence.
One might think that interpretation of comparative critical sentences is required because
there is comparison across worlds. But in a Collingwoodian mentalism, this is not so. For
Collingwood, our experience of the actual world is not qualitatively different from our
experience of a fictional world, so as long as the comparison across worlds occurs in terms
which are commensurate between these two worlds, there is no issue in taking the sentences
literally. An example of worlds which are not commensurate would be attempting to compare,
for example, the world of Superman with the world of Lord of the Rings. We cannot really say
whether Superman is stronger than Sauron because we have no real bar for comparison. We
might invent a fictional world in which the characters coexist, but this would still tell us nothing
of the original comparison. So what makes two worlds commensurate is that the worlds have
similar principles of generation. If there is sufficient difference between the principles of
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generation of two worlds, comparison cannot be had. In Lord of the Rings, there are physical
gods; whereas, in Superman, there are absurdly strong aliens. Each has a weakness (Superman
has kryptonite and Sauron the One Ring), and each is invincible aside from that weakness.
Because neither has fought a common foe besides normal human beings (who are not a challenge
for either), it is impossible to answer the question “Who is stronger, Superman or Sauron?” This
is how neither world shares the principles of generation of the other, and it is why we cannot say
what would happen in a fight between Superman and Sauron.
And what of our analytic critical sentence? Our interpretation of „Raskolnikov is an
archetypal character‟ will depend entirely on how we define “character”. In addressing the
Bifurcation on Collingwood‟s theory, we concluded that pretenses are shared via communication
concerning the pretense. Because our ability to communicate is limited and because we conform
our communication concerning canonical works to the master-expression (the text), our critical
discussion of fictional characters will be artificially limited to what was actually said by the
author. This artificial limitation amounts to a cordoning off of those properties in our pretense
which were expressed by the author from those properties which were not. A “character” has
only those properties which were expressed (either implicitly or explicitly) by the author.
Consequently, we may also interpret these sentences literally.
While fictional and critical sentences are interpreted literally in a Collingwoodian
mentalism, we must never keep far from our minds the fact that references to Sherlock Holmes
the person and to Sherlock Holmes the character both refer to different entities for each person
who speaks their names. When I speak about Sherlock Holmes the person, I refer to my own
mental construct and when you speak about Sherlock Holmes the character, you refer to your
own mental construct. The difference between the person and the character is not that we refer to
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the same entity when we speak about the character, but that the entities about which we speak
when we refer to characters have the same properties. And this is not the case when we refer to
the person. Thus, when we share a pretense, what we share is not the mental construct, but the
form or structure of the mental construct.
Interpretation under Collingwoodian Mentalism
(F1) (a″″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin.
(F2) (a″″) Sherlock Holmes1 is a more clever detective than Porfiry Petrovich1.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes1 is more famous than any real detective.
(c″″) Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal character.
(F3) (a″″) Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist independent of human cognition.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes does not exist independent of human cognition.
4.5 Conclusion
We began our essay by laying out the concepts which we take as central to any
phenomenally faithful theory of fiction: (a) there is a problem of ontology in our discourse about
fiction which demands a theory beyond mere common sense; (b) within our discourse about
fiction, there is a sharp distinction which cannot be denied by anyone who partakes in the
discourse: the engaged versus the disengaged context; (c) there are a series of intuitions which
must be accommodated by our theory, most importantly, the intuitions that fictional worlds are
(i) complete and (ii) created rather than discovered.
While our express goal was to devise a mentalist theory of ficta, the path to this goal took
us through three alternate theories. The analytic tradition has provided us with two theories of
ficta which are essentially versions of modal realism, augmented to fit the purposes of fiction.
The purpose of examining these theories in an effort to produce an anti-realist theory is that,
incidentally, one of them demonstrates the potential pitfalls that a theory of fiction might face;
whereas, the other demonstrates the way in which a theory may be augmented in order to avoid
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such pitfalls. Specifically, our examination of concrete realism demonstrated that, among other
troubles, a purely realist theory cannot but fail to accommodate the Bifurcation in Speech. Our
examination of abstract realism showed us (a) that a realist theory of fiction can avoid these
pitfalls by incorporating an anti-realist concept of pretense and (b) that some form of anti-realism
is necessary to the project of producing a theory of fiction. These discoveries suggested to us that
our project of constructing a mentalist theory of fiction should begin with pretense and it should
maintain a strictly anti-realist position.
After laying out the fundamental features of pretense theory as established by Walton and
extended by Yablo, we found that a pretense theorist which claims to be able to explain fiction
arrives at an ontological dilemma, either horn of which brings the pretense theorist to a Cartesian
ontological conclusion concerning pretenses. We concluded in section 3.3.5 that the fictional
fictionalist‟s dependence upon the ubiquity and reflexivity of pretenses ultimately entails an
ontological claim similar to the cogito: „I pretend, therefore I am,‟ which is revised to „There is
pretending.‟ And Collingwood‟s reduction of imagination to thought suggests that this similarity
was not an illusion – the pretense cogito is a subset of the standard cogito, „There is thinking.‟
While we make no claims about the relationship between mind and matter, the phenomenon of
thought demonstrates to us unequivocally that if anything exists, thought exists. Therefore, an
ontology of pretense was found to be entirely unavoidable, and the pretense theorist‟s attempt to
reflexively (or circularly) explain fiction failed. In response to this failure of pretense theory to
support a theory of fiction by itself, we naïvely took pretenses as mentalia (or thoughts) and
adopted the fictional fictionalist‟s mechanisms for adopting the realist‟s pretense concerning
fictional characters. But this naïve mentalism failed due to its inability to externalize pretenses,
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for without some method of securing a reliable external pretense, we cannot accommodate the
disengaged side of the Bifurcation.
We therefore rejected the reflexive pretense mechanism introduced by Yablo and Everett
as a means of adopting the abstract realist‟s theory without committing ourselves to the abstract
realist‟s ontology. In its place, we established a theory of expression which inextricably
conjoined the experience of a pretense with the expression of that pretense. By reducing
language to expression, we were able to borrow Wittgenstein‟s Private Language Argument to
combat the failure of naïve mentalism – the inability to secure a reliable externalization of
pretenses in order to accommodate the disengaged side of the Bifurcation. For Wittgenstein,
despite the privacy of emotions and sensations, there can be no such thing as a human language
which is private in principle. Similarly, though the only ontological commitments a
Collingwoodian theory of fiction has are to human emotions and sensations, there is still a nontrivial sense in which we may communicate to each other concerning these emotions and
sensations. This communication is the act of expression.
This form of externalization is not truly external to human cognition; rather, what is
externalized is the human mind. For, as we all know, absent a sapient being who understands an
expression (and thereby re-expresses the emotions originally expressed in the expression to
himself), a text would be nothing more than a pile of paper and ink – so the thought never
achieves independence from human cognition. The expressive habits of human beings are so
similar to each other that there is a relevant sense in which a thought (emotion) can be shared by
human beings – and this shared thought is captured in an expression. Consequently, we have an
inter-subjective anti-realist ontology of ficta and fictional worlds on our hands. So our first
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conclusion is that the anti-realist position endorsed herein amounts to a union of Waltonian
phenomenology, and Collingwoodian theory.
Our second conclusion is that a comparison of the various interpretations of the three
classes of sentences about fiction will make it obvious that the mentalist theory constructed
herein is capable of providing the most faithful interpretations. The Collingwoodian theory, then,
is the closest theory to common sense concerning discourse about ficta and fictional worlds. For
the reader‟s convenience we will list the original sentences and all four interpretations below:
Types of Fictional Sentences to Be Interpreted
(F1) (a)
(b)
(F2) (a)
(b)
(c)
(F3) (a)
(b)

Rodion Raskolnikov is a murderer.
Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.
Sherlock Holmes is a more clever detective than Porfiry Petrovich.
Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective.
Rodion Raskolnikov is an archetypal character.
Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist.
Sherlock Holmes does not exist.

Interpretation under Concrete Realism
(F1) (a′) In wCP, Rodion Raskolnikov is a murderer.
(b′) In wSH, Sherlock Holmes plays the violin.
(F2) (a′) „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more clever detective in wSH than „Porfiry
Petrovich‟ does in wCP.
(b′) In wSH „Sherlock Holmes‟ functions as a more famous than any detective does in
the actual world.
(c′) In wCP „Rodion Raskolnikov‟ plays an archetypal role.
(F3) (a′) Rodion Raskolnikov does not actually exist.
(b′) Sherlock Holmes does not actually exist.
Interpretation under Abstract Realism
(F1) (a″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer. [no truth value]
(b″) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin. [no truth value]
(F2) (a″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to x degree of cleverness;
whereas Porfiry Petrovich2 encodes being-a-clever-detective to y degree of
cleverness, and x > y.
(b″) Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-famous-detective to x degree of famousness,
and x is greater than the degree of famousness to which any real person exemplifies
being-a-famous-detective
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(c″)
(F3) (a1″)
(a2″)
(b1″)
(b2″)

Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal bundle of human properties.
Rodion Raskolnikov1 does not exist.
Rodion Raskolnikov2 does not exist except as an abstract entity.
Sherlock Holmes1 does not exist.
Sherlock Holmes2 does not exist except as an abstract entity.

Interpretation under Fictional Fictionalism
(F1) (a″′) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer in wCP.
(b″′) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin in wSH.
(F2) (a″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-cleverdetective to x degree; whereas Porfiry Petrovich2 encodes being-a-clever-detective
to y degree of cleverness, and x > y.
(b″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Sherlock Holmes2 encodes being-a-famousdetective to x degree of famousness, and x is greater than the degree of famousness
to which any real person exemplifies being-a-famous-detective.
(c″′) According to the realist‟s paraphrase, Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal bundle
of human properties.
(F3) (a″′) Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist.
(b″′) Sherlock Holmes does not exist.
Interpretation under Collingwoodian Mentalism
(F1) (a″″) Rodion Raskolnikov1 is a murderer.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes1 plays the violin.
(F2) (a″″) Sherlock Holmes1 is a more clever detective than Porfiry Petrovich1.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes1 is more famous than any real detective.
(c″″) Rodion Raskolnikov2 is an archetypal character.
(F3) (a″″) Rodion Raskolnikov does not exist independent of human cognition.
(b″″) Sherlock Holmes does not exist independent of human cognition.
Our third and final conclusion is that there is now a path open to the Collingwoodian
mentalist for undermining the abstract realist theory of fiction, should such a mentalist so choose.
In adopting a purely anti-realist theory of fiction, the Collingwoodian mentalist is still capable of
being faithful to the project of fictionalism. With this in mind, such a mentalist must first reduce
all discourses previously thought to incur ontological commitments (modal logic, mathematics,
identity, causality, etc.) to discourses which occur within Collingwoodian/Waltonian pretenses.
Such a construal of these pretenses will curtail their ontological commitments to nothing more
than an anti-realist ontological commitment to private human emotions and sensations. Once this
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(admittedly enormous) task is complete, the Collingwoodian mentalist may then return to the
abstract realist‟s theory of fiction and firmly accuse it of violating Occam‟s razor: when abstract
entities are eliminated from all other discourses, the very existence of a functional anti-realist
theory of fiction will render all realist theories excessive in their ontologies.
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